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Harmful lies are nothing new. But the ability to distort reality has
taken an exponential leap forward with “deep fake” technology. This
capability makes it possible to create audio and video of real people
saying and doing things they never said or did. Machine learning
techniques are escalating the technology’s sophistication, making
deep fakes ever more realistic and increasingly resistant to detection.
Deep-fake technology has characteristics that enable rapid and
widespread diffusion, putting it into the hands of both sophisticated
and unsophisticated actors.
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While deep-fake technology will bring certain benefits, it also will
introduce many harms. The marketplace of ideas already suffers from
truth decay as our networked information environment interacts in
toxic ways with our cognitive biases. Deep fakes will exacerbate this
problem significantly. Individuals and businesses will face novel forms
of exploitation, intimidation, and personal sabotage. The risks to our
democracy and to national security are profound as well.
Our aim is to provide the first in-depth assessment of the causes
and consequences of this disruptive technological change, and to
explore the existing and potential tools for responding to it. We survey
a broad array of responses, including: the role of technological
solutions; criminal penalties, civil liability, and regulatory action;
military and covert-action responses; economic sanctions; and market
developments. We cover the waterfront from immunities to immutable
authentication trails, offering recommendations to improve law and
policy and anticipating the pitfalls embedded in various solutions.
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INTRODUCTION
Through the magic of social media, it all went viral: a vivid photograph, an
inflammatory fake version, an animation expanding on the fake, posts debunking
the fakes, and stories trying to make sense of the situation.1 It was both a sign of
the times and a cautionary tale about the challenges ahead.
The episode centered on Emma González, a student who survived the
horrific shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland,
Florida, in February 2018. In the aftermath of the shooting, a number of the
students emerged as potent voices in the national debate over gun control. Emma,
in particular, gained prominence thanks to the closing speech she delivered
during the “March for Our Lives” protest in Washington, D.C., as well as a
contemporaneous article she wrote for Teen Vogue.2 Fatefully, the Teen Vogue

1. Alex Horton, A Fake Photo of Emma González Went Viral on the Far Right, Where
Parkland Teens are Villains, WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theintersect/wp/2018/03/25/a-fake-photo-of-emma-gonzalez-went-viral-on-the-far-right-where-parklandteens-are-villains/?utm_term=.0b0f8655530d [https://perma.cc/6NDJ-WADV].
2. Florida Student Emma Gonzalez [sic] to Lawmakers and Gun Advocates: ‘We call BS’,
CNN (Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/17/us/florida-student-emma-gonzalezspeech/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZE3B-MVPD]; Emma González, Emma González on Why This
VOGUE
(Mar.
23,
2018),
Generation
Needs
Gun
Control,
TEEN
https://www.teenvogue.com/story/emma-gonzalez-parkland-gun-control-cover?mbid=social_twitter
[https://perma.cc/P8TQ-P2ZR].

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3213954

1756

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107:1753

piece incorporated a video entitled “This Is Why We March,” including a
visually arresting sequence in which Emma rips up a large sheet displaying a
bullseye target.
A powerful still image of Emma ripping up the bullseye target began to
circulate on the Internet. But soon someone generated a fake version, in which
the torn sheet is not a bullseye, but rather a copy of the Constitution of the United
States. While on some level the fake image might be construed as artistic fiction
highlighting the inconsistency of gun control with the Second Amendment, the
fake was not framed that way. Instead, it was depicted as a true image of Emma
González ripping up the Constitution.
The image soon went viral. A fake of the video also appeared, though it

was more obvious that it had been manipulated. Still, the video circulated widely,
thanks in part to actor Adam Baldwin circulating it to a quarter million followers
on Twitter (along with the disturbing hashtag #Vorwärts—the German word for
“forward,” a reference to neo-Nazis’ nod to the word’s role in a Hitler Youth
anthem). 3
Several factors combined to limit the harm from this fakery. First, the
genuine image already was in wide circulation and available at its original
source. This made it fast and easy to fact-check the fakes. Second, the intense
national attention associated with the post-Parkland gun control debate and,
especially, the role of students like Emma in that debate, ensured that journalists
paid attention to the issue, spending time and effort to debunk the fakes. Third,
the fakes were of poor quality (though audiences inclined to believe their
message might disregard the red flags).
Even with those constraints, though, many believed the fakes, and harm
ensued. Our national dialogue on gun control has suffered some degree of

3.

See Horton, supra note 1.
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distortion; Emma has likely suffered some degree of anguish over the episode;
and other Parkland victims likely felt maligned and discredited. Falsified
imagery, in short, has already exacted significant costs for individuals and
society. But the situation is about to get much worse, as this Article shows.
Technologies for altering images, video, or audio (or even creating them
from scratch) in ways that are highly -realistic and difficult to detect are maturing
rapidly. As they ripen and diffuse, the problems illustrated by the Emma
González episode will expand and generate significant policy and legal
challenges. Imagine a deep fake video, released the day before an election,
making it appear that a candidate for office has made an inflammatory statement.
Or what if, in the wake of the Trump-Putin tête-à-tête at Helsinki in 2018,
someone circulated a deep fake audio recording that seemed to portray President
Trump as promising not to take any action should Russia interfere with certain
NATO allies. Screenwriters are already building such prospects into their
plotlines.4 The real world will not lag far behind.
Pornographers have been early adopters of the technology, interposing the
faces of celebrities into sex videos. This has given rise to the label “deep fake”
for such digitized impersonations. We use that label here more broadly, as
shorthand for the full range of hyper-realistic digital falsification of images,
video, and audio.
This full range will entail, sooner rather than later, a disturbing array of
malicious uses. We are by no means the first to observe that deep fakes will
migrate far beyond the pornography context, with great potential for harm.5 We
4. See, e.g., Vindu Goel & Sheera Frenkel, In India Election, False Posts and Hate Speech
Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
1,
2019),
Flummox
Facebook,
N.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/01/technology/india-elections-facebook.html
[https://perma.cc/B9CP-MPPK] (describing the deluge of fake and manipulated videos and images
circulated in the lead up to elections in India); Homeland: Like Bad at Things (Showtime television
broadcast Mar. 4, 2018), https://www.sho.com/homeland/season/7/episode/4/like-bad-at-things
[https://perma.cc/25XK-NN3Y]; Taken: Verum Nocet (NBC television broadcast Mar. 30, 2018)
https://www.nbc.com/taken/video/verum-nocet/3688929 [https://perma.cc/CVP2-PNXZ] (depicting a
deep-fake video in which a character appears to recite song lyrics); The Good Fight: Day 408 (CBS
television broadcast Mar. 4, 2018) (depicting fake audio purporting to be President Trump); The Good
Fight: Day 464 (CBS television broadcast Apr. 29, 2018) (featuring a deep-fake video of the alleged
“golden shower” incident involving President Trump).
5. See, e.g., Samantha Cole, We Are Truly Fucked: Everyone is Making AI-Generated Fake
MOTHERBOARD
(Jan.
24,
2018),
Porn
Now,
VICE:
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/bjye8a/reddit-fake-porn-app-daisy-ridley
[https://perma.cc/V9NT-CBW8] (“[T]echnology[] allows anyone with sufficient raw footage to work
with to convincingly place any face in any video.”); see also @BuzzFeed, You Won’t Believe What
(Apr.
17,
2018,
8:00
AM),
Obama
Says
in
This
Video,
TWITTER
https://twitter.com/BuzzFeed/status/986257991799222272 [https://perma.cc/C38K-B377] (“We’re
entering an era in which our enemies can make anyone say anything at any point in time.”); Tim Mak,
All Things Considered: Technologies to Create Fake Audio and Video Are Quickly Evolving, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/02/598916380/technologies-to-create-fakeaudio-and-video-are-quickly-evolving [https://perma.cc/NY23-YVQD] (discussing deep-fake videos
created for political reasons and misinformation campaigns); Julian Sanchez (@normative), TWITTER
(Jan. 24, 2018, 12:26 PM) (“The prospect of any Internet rando being able to swap anyone’s face into
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do, however, provide the first comprehensive survey of these harms and potential
responses to them. We break new ground by giving early warning regarding the
powerful incentives that deep fakes produce for privacy-destructive solutions.
This Article unfolds as follows. Part I begins with a description of the
technological innovations pushing deep fakes into the realm of hyper-realism
and making them increasingly difficult to debunk. It then discusses the
amplifying power of social media and the confounding influence of cognitive
biases.
Part II surveys the benefits and the costs of deep fakes. The upsides of deep
fakes include artistic exploration and educative contributions. The downsides of
deep fakes, however, are as varied as they are costly. Some harms are suffered
by individuals or groups, such as when deep fakes are deployed to exploit or
sabotage individual identities and corporate opportunities. Others impact society
more broadly, such as distortion of policy debates, manipulation of elections,
erosion of trust in institutions, exacerbation of social divisions, damage to
national security, and disruption of international relations. And, in what we call
the “liar’s dividend,” deep fakes make it easier for liars to avoid accountability
for things that are in fact true.
Part III turns to the question of remedies. We survey an array of existing or
potential solutions involving civil and criminal liability, agency regulation, and
“active measures” in special contexts like armed conflict and covert action. We
also discuss technology-driven market responses, including not just the
promotion of debunking technologies, but also the prospect of an alibi service,
such as privacy-destructive life logging. We find, in the end, that there are no
silver-bullet solutions. Thus, we couple our recommendations with warnings to
the public, policymakers, and educators.
I.
TECHNOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE DEEP-FAKES PROBLEM
Digital impersonation is increasingly realistic and convincing. Deep-fake
technology is the cutting-edge of that trend. It leverages machine-learning
algorithms to insert faces and voices into video and audio recordings of actual
people and enables the creation of realistic impersonations out of digital whole
cloth.6 The end result is realistic-looking video or audio making it appear that
someone said or did something. Although deep fakes can be created with the
consent of people being featured, more often they will be created without it. This
Part describes the technology and the forces ensuring its diffusion, virality, and
entrenchment.

porn is incredibly creepy. But my first thought is that we have not even scratched the surface of how bad
‘fake news’ is going to get.”).
6. See Cole, supra note 5.
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A. Emergent Technology for Robust Deep Fakes
Doctored imagery is neither new nor rare. Innocuous doctoring of images—
such as tweaks to lighting or the application of a filter to improve image
quality—is ubiquitous. Tools like Photoshop enable images to be tweaked in
both superficial and substantive ways.7 The field of digital forensics has been
grappling with the challenge of detecting digital alterations for some time.8
Generally, forensic techniques are automated and thus less dependent on the
human eye to spot discrepancies.9 While the detection of doctored audio and
video was once fairly straightforward,10 the emergence of generative technology
capitalizing on machine learning promises to shift this balance. It will enable the
production of altered (or even wholly invented) images, videos, and audios that
are more realistic and more difficult to debunk than they have been in the past.
This technology often involves the use of a “neural network” for machine
learning. The neural network begins as a kind of tabula rasa featuring a nodal
network controlled by a set of numerical standards set at random.11 Much as
experience refines the brain’s neural nodes, examples train the neural network
system.12 If the network processes a broad array of training examples, it should
be able to create increasingly accurate models.13 It is through this process that
neural networks categorize audio, video, or images and generate realistic
impersonations or alterations.14

7. See, e.g., Stan Horaczek, Spot Faked Photos Using Digital Forensic Techniques, POPULAR
SCIENCE (July 21, 2017), https://www.popsci.com/use-photo-forensics-to-spot-faked-images
[https://perma.cc/G72B-VLF2] (depicting and discussing a series of manipulated photographs).
8. Doctored images have been prevalent since the advent of the photography. See PHOTO
TAMPERING THROUGHOUT HISTORY, http://pth.izitru.com [https://perma.cc/5QSZ-NULR]. The
gallery was curated by FourandSix Technologies, Inc.
9. See Tiffanie Wen, The Hidden Signs That Can Reveal a Fake Photo, BBC FUTURE (June
30, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20170629-the-hidden-signs-that-can-reveal-if-a-photo-isfake [https://perma.cc/W9NX-XGKJ]. IZITRU.COM was a project spearheaded by Dartmouth’s Dr.
Hany Farid. It allowed users to upload photos to determine if they were fakes. The service was aimed at
“legions of citizen journalists who want[ed] to dispel doubts that what they [were] posting [wa]s real.”
Rick Gladstone, Photos Trusted but Verified, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2014),
https://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/07/photos-trusted-but-verified [https://perma.cc/7A73-URKP].
10. See Steven Melendez, How DARPA‘s Fighting Deepfakes, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://www.fastcompany.com/40551971/can-new-forensic-tech-win-war-on-ai-generated-fakeimages [https://perma.cc/9A8L-LFTQ].
11. Larry Hardesty, Explained: Neural Networks, MIT NEWS (Apr. 14, 2017),
http://news.mit.edu/2017/explained-neural-networks-deep-learning-0414
[https://perma.cc/VTA64Z2D].
12. Natalie Wolchover, New Theory Cracks Open the Black Box of Deep Neural Networks,
(Oct.
8,
2017),
https://www.wired.com/story/new-theory-deep-learning
WIRED
[https://perma.cc/UEL5-69ND].
13. Will Knight, Meet the Fake Celebrities Dreamed Up By AI, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 31,
2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/the-download/609290/meet-the-fake-celebrities-dreamedup-by-ai [https://perma.cc/D3A3-JFY4].
14. Will Knight, Real or Fake? AI is Making it Very Hard to Know, MIT TECH. REV. (May 1,
2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604270/real-or-fake-ai-is-making-it-very-hard-to-know
[https://perma.cc/3MQN-A4VH].
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To take a prominent example, researchers at the University of Washington
have created a neural network tool that alters videos so speakers say something
different from what they originally said.15 They demonstrated the technology
with a video of former President Barack Obama (for whom plentiful video
footage was available to train the network) that made it appear that he said things
that he had not.16
By itself, the emergence of machine learning through neural network
methods would portend a significant increase in the capacity to create false
images, videos, and audio. But the story does not end there. Enter “generative
adversarial networks,” otherwise known as GANs. The GAN approach, invented
by Google researcher Ian Goodfellow, brings two neural networks to bear
simultaneously.17 One network, known as the generator, draws on a dataset to
produce a sample that mimics the dataset.18 The other network, the discriminator,
assesses the degree to which the generator succeeded.19 In an iterative fashion,
the assessments from the discriminator inform the assessments of the generator.
The result far exceeds the speed, scale, and nuance of what human reviewers
could achieve.20 Growing sophistication of the GAN approach is sure to lead to
the production of increasingly convincing deep fakes.21

15. SUPASORN SUWAJANAKORN ET AL., SYNTHESIZING OBAMA: LEARNING LIP SYNC FROM
AUDIO, 36 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON GRAPHICS, no. 4, art. 95 (July 2017),
http://grail.cs.washington.edu/projects/AudioToObama/siggraph17_obama.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7DCY-XK58]; James Vincent, New AI Research Makes It Easier to Create Fake
VERGE
(July
12,
2017),
Footage
of
Someone
Speaking,
https://www.theverge.com/2017/7/12/15957844/ai-fake-video-audio-speech-obama
[https://perma.cc/3SKP-EKGT].
16. Charles Q. Choi, AI Creates Fake Obama, IEEE SPECTRUM (July 12, 2017),
https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/robotics/artificial-intelligence/ai-creates-fake-obama
[https://perma.cc/M6GP-TNZ4]; see also Joon Son Chung et al., You Said That? (July 18, 2017) (British
Machine Vision conference paper), https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.02966 [https://perma.cc/6NAH-MAYL].
17. See Ian J. Goodfellow et al., Generative Adversarial Nets (June 10, 2014) (Neural
Information
Processing
Systems
conference
paper),
https://arxiv.org/abs/1406.2661
[https://perma.cc/97SH-H7DD] (introducing the GAN approach); see also Tero Karras, et al.,
Progressive Growing of GANs for Improved Quality, Stability, and Variation, ICLR 2018, at 1-2 (Apr.
2018) (conference paper), http://research.nvidia.com/sites/default/files/pubs/2017-10_ProgressiveGrowing-of/karras2018iclr-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/RSK2-NBAE] (explaining neural networks in
the GAN approach).
18. Karras, supra note 17, at 1.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2.
21. Consider research conducted at Nvidia. Karras, supra note 17, at 2 (explaining a novel
approach that begins training cycles with low-resolution images and gradually shifts to higher-resolution
images, producing better and much quicker results). The New York Times recently profiled the Nvidia
team’s work. See Cade Metz & Keith Collins, How an A.I. ‘Cat-and-Mouse Game’ Generates
TIMES
(Jan.
2,
2018),
Believable
Fake
Photos,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/02/technology/ai-generated-photos.html
[https://perma.cc/6DLQ-RDWD]. For further illustrations of the GAN approach, see Martin Arjovsky
et al., Wasserstein GAN (Dec. 6, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with California Law Review);
Chris Donahue et al., Semantically Decomposing the Latent Spaces of Generative Adversarial
Networks, ICLR 2018 (Feb. 22, 2018) (conference paper) (on file with California Law Review),
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The same is true with respect to generating convincing audio fakes. In the
past, the primary method of generating audio entailed the creation of a large
database of sound fragments from a source, which would then be combined and
reordered to generate simulated speech. New approaches promise greater
sophistication, including Google DeepMind’s “Wavenet” model,22 Baidu’s
DeepVoice,23 and GAN models.24 Startup Lyrebird has posted short audio clips
simulating Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Hillary Clinton discussing its
technology with admiration.25
In comparison to private and academic efforts to develop deep-fake
technology, less is currently known about governmental research.26 Given the
possible utility of deep-fake techniques for various government purposes—
including the need to defend against hostile uses—it is a safe bet that state actors

https://github.com/chrisdonahue/sdgan; Phillip Isola et al., Image-to-Image Translation with
Conditional Adversarial Nets (Nov. 26, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with California Law
Review); Alec Radford et al., Unsupervised Representation Learning with Deep Convolutional
Generative Adversarial Networks (Jan. 7, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with California Law
Review); Jun-Yan Zhu et al., Unpaired Image-to-Image Translation Using Cycle-Consistent Adversarial
Networks (Nov. 15, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with California Law Review).
22. Aaron van den Oord et al., WaveNet: A Generative Model for Raw Audio (Sept. 19, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with California Law Review), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.03499.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QX4W-E6JT].
23. Ben Popper, Baidu’s New System Can Learn to Imitate Every Accent, VERGE (Oct. 24,
2017),
https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/24/16526370/baidu-deepvoice-3-ai-text-to-speech-voice
[https://perma.cc/NXV2-GDVJ].
24. See Chris Donahue et al., Adversarial Audio Synthesis (Feb. 9, 2019) (conference paper),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.04208.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5UG-334U]; Yang Gao et al., Voice
Impersonation Using Generative Adversarial Networks (Feb. 19, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.06840 [https://perma.cc/5HZV-ZLD3].
25. See Bahar Gholipour, New AI Tech Can Mimic Any Voice, SCI. AM. (May 2, 2017),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/new-ai-tech-can-mimic-any-voice [https://perma.cc/2HSP83C3]. The ability to cause havoc by using this technology to portray persons saying things they have
never said looms large. Lyrebird’s website includes an “ethics” statement, which defensively invokes
notions of technological determinism. The statement argues that impersonation technology is inevitable
and that society benefits from gradual introduction to it. Ethics, LYREBIRD, https://lyrebird.ai/ethics
[https://perma.cc/Q57E-G6MK] (“Imagine that we had decided not to release this technology at all.
Others would develop it and who knows if their intentions would be as sincere as ours: they could, for
example, only sell the technology to a specific company or an ill-intentioned organization. By contrast,
we are making the technology available to anyone and we are introducing it incrementally so that society
can adapt to it, leverage its positive aspects for good, while preventing potentially negative
applications.”).
26. DARPA’s MediFor program is working to “[develop] technologies for the automated
assessment of the integrity of an image or video and [integrate] these in an end-to-end media forensics
platform.” Matt Turek, Media Forensics (MediFor), DEF. ADVANCED RES. PROJECTS AGENCY,
https://www.darpa.mil/program/media-forensics [https://perma.cc/VBY5-BQJA]. IARPA’s DIVA
program is attempting to use artificial intelligence to identify threats by sifting through video imagery.
Deep Intermodal Video Analytics (DIVA) Program, INTELLIGENCE ADVANCED RES. PROJECTS
ACTIVITY, https://www.iarpa.gov/index.php/research-programs/diva [https://perma.cc/4VDX-B68W].
There are no grants from the National Science Foundation awarding federal dollars to researchers
studying the detection of doctored audio and video content at this time. E-mail from Seth M. Goldstein,
Project Manager, IARPA, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Samuel Morse (Apr. 6,
2018, 7:49 AM) (on file with authors).
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are conducting classified research in this area. However, it is unclear whether
classified research lags behind or outpaces commercial and academic efforts. At
the least, we can say with confidence that industry, academia, and governments
have the motive, means, and opportunity to push this technology forward at a
rapid clip.
B. Diffusion of Deep-Fake Technology
The capacity to generate persuasive deep fakes will not stay in the hands of
either technologically sophisticated or responsible actors.27 For better or worse,
deep-fake technology will diffuse and democratize rapidly.
As Benjamin Wittes and Gabriella Blum explained in The Future of
Violence: Robots and Germs, Hackers and Drones, technologies—even
dangerous ones—tend to diffuse over time.28 Firearms developed for statecontrolled armed forces are now sold to the public for relatively modest prices.29
The tendency for technologies to spread only lags if they require scarce inputs
that function (or are made to function) as chokepoints to curtail access.30 Scarcity
as a constraint on diffusion works best where the input in question is tangible
and hard to obtain; such as plutonium or highly enriched uranium to create
nuclear weapons.31
Often though, the only scarce input for a new technology is the knowledge
behind a novel process or unique data sets. Where the constraint involves an
intangible resource like information, preserving secrecy requires not only
security against theft, espionage, and mistaken disclosure, but also the capacity
and will to keep the information confidential.32 Depending on the circumstances,
the relevant actors may not want to keep the information to themselves and,
indeed, may have affirmative commercial or intellectual motivation to disperse
it, as in the case of academics or business enterprises.33

27. See Jaime Dunaway, Reddit (Finally) Bans Deepfake Communities, but Face-Swapping
Porn Isn’t Going Anywhere, SLATE (Feb. 8, 2018), https://slate.com/technology/2018/02/reddit-finallybans-deepfake-communities-but-face-swapping-porn-isnt-going-anywhere.html
[https://perma.cc/A4Z7-2LDF].
28. See generally BENJAMIN WITTES & GABRIELLA BLUM, THE FUTURE OF VIOLENCE:
ROBOTS AND GERMS, HACKERS AND DRONES. CONFRONTING A NEW AGE OF THREAT (2015).
29. Fresh Air: Assault Style Weapons in the Civilian Market, NPR (radio broadcast Dec. 20,
2012). Program host Terry Gross interviews Tom Diaz, a policy analyst for the Violence Policy Center.
A
transcript
of
the
interview
can
be
found
at
https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=167694808 [https://perma.cc/CE3F5AFX].
30. See generally GRAHAM T. ALLISON ET AL., AVOIDING NUCLEAR ANARCHY (1996).
31. Id.
32. The techniques that are used to combat cyber attacks and threats are often published in
scientific papers, so that a multitude of actors can implement these shields as a defense measure.
However, the sophisticated malfeasor can use this information to create cyber weapons that circumvent
the defenses that researchers create.
33. In April 2016, the hacker group “Shadow Brokers” released malware that had allegedly been
created by the National Security Agency (NSA). One month later, the malware was used to propagate
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Consequently, the capacity to generate deep fakes is sure to diffuse rapidly
no matter what efforts are made to safeguard it. The capacity does not depend on
scarce tangible inputs, but rather on access to knowledge like GANs and other
approaches to machine learning. As the volume and sophistication of publicly
available deep-fake research and services increase, user-friendly tools will be
developed and propagated online, allowing diffusion to reach beyond experts.
Such diffusion has occurred in the past both through commercial and blackmarket means, as seen with graphic manipulation tools like Photoshop and
malware services on the dark web.34 User-friendly capacity to generate deep
fakes likely will follow a similar course on both dimensions.35
Indeed, diffusion has begun for deep-fake technology. The recent wave of
attention generated by deep fakes began after a Reddit user posted a tool inserting
the faces of celebrities into porn videos.36 Once Fake App, “a desktop app for
creating photorealistic faceswap videos made with deep learning,” appeared
online, the public adopted it in short order.37 Following the straightforward steps
provided by Fake App, a New York Times reporter created a semi-realistic deepfake video of his face on actor Chris Pratt’s body with 1,861 images of himself
and 1,023 images of Chris Pratt.38 After enlisting the help of someone with
experience blending facial features and source footage, the reporter created a
realistic video featuring him as Jimmy Kimmel.39 This portends the diffusion of
ever more sophisticated versions of deep-fake technology.
C. Fueling the Fire
The capacity to create deep fakes comes at a perilous time. No longer is the
public’s attention exclusively in the hands of trusted media companies.
Individuals peddling deep fakes can quickly reach a massive, even global,

the WannaCry cyber attacks, which wreaked havoc on network systems around the globe, threatening
to erase files if a ransom was not paid through Bitcoin. See Bruce Schneier, Who Are the Shadow
(May
23,
2017),
Brokers?,
ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/05/shadow-brokers/527778
[https://perma.cc/UW2F-V36G].
34. See ARMOR, THE BLACK MARKET REPORT: A LOOK INSIDE THE DARK WEB 2 (2018),
https://www.armor.com/app/uploads/2018/03/2018-Q1-Reports-BlackMarket-DIGITAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4UJA-QJ94] (explaining that the means to conduct a DDoS attack can be purchased
for $10/hour, or $200/day).
35. See id.
36. Emma Grey Ellis, People Can Put Your Face on Porn—And the Law Can’t Help You,
(Jan.
26,
2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/face-swap-porn-legal-limbo
WIRED
[https://perma.cc/B7K7-Y79L].
37. FAKEAPP, https://www.fakeapp.org.
38. Kevin Roose, Here Come the Fake Videos, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/04/technology/fake-videos-deepfakes.html
[https://perma.cc/U5QE-EPHX].
39. Id.
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audience. As this section explores, networked phenomena, rooted in cognitive
bias, will fuel that effort.40
Twenty-five years ago, the practical ability of individuals and organizations
to distribute images, audio, and video (whether authentic or not) was limited. In
most countries, a handful of media organizations disseminated content on a
national or global basis. In the U.S., the major television and radio networks,
newspapers, magazines, and book publishers controlled the spread of
information.41 While governments, advertisers, and prominent figures could
influence mass media, most were left to pursue local distribution of content. For
better or worse, relatively few individuals or entities could reach large audiences
in this few-to-many information distribution environment.42
The information revolution has disrupted this content distribution model.43
Today, innumerable platforms facilitate global connectivity. Generally speaking,
the networked environment blends the few-to-many and many-to-many models
of content distribution, democratizing access to communication to an
unprecedented degree.44 This reduces the overall amount of gatekeeping, though
control still remains with the companies responsible for our digital
infrastructure.45 For instance, content platforms have terms-of-service
agreements, which ban certain forms of content based on companies’ values.46
40. See generally DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014)
[hereinafter CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE] (exploring pathologies attendant to online speech
including deindividuation, virality, information cascades, group polarization, and filter bubbles). For
important early work on filter bubbles, echo chambers, and group polarization in online interactions, see
generally ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE INTERNET IS HIDING FROM YOU (2011); CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001).
41. See generally NICHOLAS CARR, THE BIG SWITCH: REWIRING THE WORLD, FROM EDISON
TO GOOGLE (2008); HOWARD RHEINGOLD, SMART MOBS: THE NEXT SOCIAL REVOLUTION (2002).
42. See id.
43. See generally SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING (AND WHY
WE SHOULD WORRY) (2011).
44. This ably captures the online environment accessible for those living in the United States.
As Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu argued a decade ago, geographic borders and the will of governments
can and do make themselves known online. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO OWNS
THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (2006). The Internet visible in China is vastly
different from the Internet visible in the EU, which is different from the Internet visible in the United
States (and likely to become more so soon). See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Economy, The Great Firewall of
(June
29,
2018)
China:
Xi
Jinping’s
Internet
Shutdown,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jun/29/the-great-firewall-of-china-xi-jinpings-internetshutdown [https://perma.cc/8GUS-EC59]; Casey Newton, Europe Is Splitting the Internet into Three:
How the Copyright Directive Reshapes the Open Web, VERGE (Mar. 27, 2019,
https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/27/18283541/european-union-copyright-directive-Internet-article13 [https://perma.cc/K235-RZ7Q].
45. Danielle Keats Citron & Neil M. Richards, Four Principles for Digital Expression (You
Won’t Believe #3!), 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1353, 1361–64 (2018).
46. See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 232–35; Danielle Keats
Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1035, 1037 (2018) [hereinafter Citron, Extremist Speech] (noting that platforms’ terms of service and
community guidelines have banned child pornography, spam, phishing, fraud, impersonation, copyright
violations, threats, cyber stalking, nonconsensual pornography, and hate speech); see also DANIELLE
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They experience pressure from, or adhere to legal mandates of, governments to
block or filter certain information like hate speech or “fake news.”47
Although private companies have enormous power to moderate content
(shadow banning it, lowering its prominence, and so on), they may decline to
filter or block content that does not amount to obvious illegality. Generally
speaking, there is far less screening of content for accuracy, quality, or
suppression of facts or opinions that some authority deems undesirable.
Content not only can find its way to online audiences, but can circulate far
and wide, sometimes going viral both online and, at times, amplifying further
once picked up by traditional media. A variety of cognitive heuristics help fuel
these dynamics. Three phenomena in particular—the “information cascade”
dynamic, human attraction to negative and novel information, and filter
bubbles—help explain why deep fakes may be especially prone to going viral.
First, consider the “information cascade” dynamic.48 Information cascades
result when people stop paying sufficient attention to their own information,
relying instead on what they assume others have reliably determined and then
passing that information along.. Because people cannot know everything, they
often rely on what others say, even if it contradicts their own knowledge.49 At a
certain point, people stop paying attention to their own information and look to
what others know.50 And when people pass along what others think, the

KEATS CITRON & QUINTA JURECIC, PLATFORM JUSTICE: CONTENT MODERATION AT AN INFLECTION
POINT 12 (Hoover Institution ed., 2018) [hereinafter CITRON & JURECIC, PLATFORM JUSTICE],
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/citron-jurecic_webreadypdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M5L6-GNCH] (noting Facebook’s Terms of Service agreement banning
nonconsensual pornography). See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV.
61 (2009) [hereinafter Citron, Cyber Civil Rights]; Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton,
Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 1435, 1458 (2011) (discussing hate speech restrictions contained in platforms’ terms of service
agreements); Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad
Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (2017) (arguing that law should incentivize
online platforms to address known illegality in a reasonable manner).
47. See Citron, Extremist Speech, supra note 46, at 1040–49 (exploring pressure from EU
Commission on major platforms to remove extremist speech and hate speech). For important work on
global censorship efforts, see the scholarship of Anupam Chander, Daphne Keller, and Rebecca
McKinnon. See generally REBECCA MCKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE WORLDWIDE
STRUGGLE FOR INTERNET FREEDOM 6 (2012) (arguing that ISPs and online platforms have “far too
much power over citizens’ lives, in ways that are insufficiently transparent or accountable to the public
interest.”); Anupam Chander, Facebookistan, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1807, 1819–35 (2012); Anupam
Chander, Googling Freedom, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5–9 (2011); Daphne Keller, Toward a Clearer
Conversation About Platform Liability, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. AT COLUM. U. (April 6, 2018),
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/toward-clearer-conversation-about-platform-liability
[https://perma.cc/GWM7-J8PW].
48. Carr, supra note 41. See generally DAVID EASLEY & JON KLEINBERG, NETWORKS,
CROWDS, AND MARKETS: REASONING ABOUT A HIGHLY CONNECTED WORLD (2010) (exploring
cognitive biases in the information marketplace); CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 (2007) (same).
49. See generally EASLEY & KLEINBERG, supra note 48.
50. Id.
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credibility of the original claim snowballs.51 As the cycle repeats, the cascade
strengthens.52
Social media platforms are a ripe environment for the formation of
information cascades spreading content of all stripes. From there, cascades can
spill over to traditional mass-audience outlets that take note of the surge of social
media interest and as a result cover a story that otherwise they might not have.53
Social movements have leveraged the power of information cascades, including
Black Lives Matter activists54 and the Never Again movement of the Parkland
High School students.55 Arab Spring protesters spread videos and photographs
of police torture.56 Journalist Howard Rheingold refers to positive information
cascades as “smart mobs.”57 But not every mob is smart or laudable, and the
information cascade dynamic does not account for such distinctions. The Russian
covert action program to sow discord in the United States during the 2016
election provides ample demonstration.58
Second, our natural tendency to propagate negative and novel information
may enable viral circulation of deep fakes. Negative and novel information
“grab[s] our attention as human beings and [] cause[s] us to want to share that
information with others—we’re attentive to novel threats and especially attentive
to negative threats.”59 Data scientists, for instance, studied 126,000 news stories
shared on Twitter from 2006 to 2010, using third-party fact-checking sites to

51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006) (elaborating the concept of social
production in relation to rapid evolution of the information marketplace and resistance to that trend).
54. See Monica Anderson & Paul Hitlin, The Hashtag #BlackLivesMatter Emerges: Social
Activism on Twitter, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.pewInternet.org/2016/08/15/thehashtag-blacklivesmatter-emerges-social-activism-on-twitter
[https://perma.cc/4BW9-L67G]
(discussing Black Lives Matter activists’ use of the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter to identify their message
and display solidarity around race and police use of force).
55. Jonah Engel Bromwich, How the Parkland Students Got So Good at Social Media, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/us/parkland-students-social-media.html
[https://perma.cc/7AW9-4HR2] (discussing students’ use of social media to keep sustained political
attention on the Parkland tragedy).
56. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 68.
57. RHEINGOLD, supra note 41.
58. The 2018 indictment of the Internet Research Agency in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia is available at https://www.justice.gov/file/1035477/download
[https://perma.cc/B6WJ-4FLX]; see also David A. Graham, What the Mueller Indictment Reveals,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/muellerroadmap/553604 [https://perma.cc/WU2U-XHWW]; Tim Mak & Audrey McNamara, Mueller
Indictment of Russian Operatives Details Playbook of Information Warfare, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb.
17, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/02/17/586690342/mueller-indictment-of-russian-operativesdetails-playbook-of-information-warfare [https://perma.cc/RJ6F-999R].
59. Robinson Meyer, The Grim Conclusions of the Largest-Ever Study of Fake News, THE
ATLANTIC (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/03/largest-studyever-fake-news-mit-twitter/555104 [https://perma.cc/PJS2-RKMF].
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classify them as true or false.60 According to the study, hoaxes and false rumors
reached people ten times faster than accurate stories.61 Even when researchers
controlled for differences between accounts originating rumors, falsehoods were
70 percent more likely to get retweeted than accurate news.62 The uneven spread
of fake news was not due to bots, which in fact retweeted falsehoods at the same
frequency as accurate information.63 Rather, false news spread faster due to
people retweeting inaccurate news items.64 The study’s authors hypothesized
that falsehoods had greater traction because they seemed more “novel” and
evocative than real news.65 False rumors tended to elicit responses expressing
surprise and disgust, while accurate stories evoked replies associated with
sadness and trust.66
With human beings seemingly more inclined to spread negative and novel
falsehoods, the field is ripe for bots to spur and escalate the spreading of negative
misinformation.67 Facebook estimates that as many as 60 million bots may be
infesting its platform.68 Bots were responsible for a substantial portion of
political content posted during the 2016 election.69 Bots also can manipulate
algorithms used to predict potential engagement with content.
Negative information not only is tempting to share, but is also relatively
“sticky.” As social science research shows, people tend to credit—and
remember—negative information far more than positive information.70 Coupled
with our natural predisposition towards certain stimuli like sex, gossip, and
violence, that tendency provides a welcome environment for harmful deep
fakes.71 The Internet amplifies this effect, which helps explain the popularity of

60. Soroush Vosoughi et al., The Spread of True and False News Online, 359 SCIENCE 1146,
1146 (2018), http://science.sciencemag.org/content/359/6380/1146/tab-pdf [https://perma.cc/5U5DUHPZ].
61. Id. at 1148.
62. Id. at 1149.
63. Id. at 1146.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1149.
66. Id. at 1146, 1150.
67. Meyer, supra note 59 (quoting political scientist Dave Karpf).
68. Nicholas Confessore et al., The Follower Factory, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/27/technology/social-media-bots.html
[https://perma.cc/DX34-RENV] (“In November, Facebook disclosed to investors that it had at least
twice as many fake users as it previously estimated, indicating that up to 60 million automated accounts
may roam the world’s largest social media platform.”); see also Extremist Content and Russian
Disinformation Online: Working with Tech to Find Solutions: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm.,
117th Cong. (2017) https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/extremist-content-and-russiandisinformation-online-working-with-tech-to-find-solutions [https://perma.cc/M5L9-R2MY].
69. David M. J. Lazer et al., The Science of Fake News: Addressing Fake News Requires a
Multidisciplinary Effort, 359 SCIENCE 1094, 1095 (2018).
70. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Kensinger, Negative Emotion Enhances Memory Accuracy:
Behavioral and Neuroimaging Evidence, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 213, 217 (2007)
(finding that “negative emotion conveys focal benefits on memory for detail”).
71. PARISER, supra note 40, at 13–14.
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gossip sites like TMZ.com.72 Because search engines produce results based on
our interests, they tend to feature more of the same—more sex and more gossip.73
Third, filter bubbles further aggravate the spread of false information. Even
without the aid of technology, we naturally tend to surround ourselves with
information confirming our beliefs. Social media platforms supercharge this
tendency by empowering users to endorse and re-share content.74 Platforms’
algorithms highlight popular information, especially if it has been shared by
friends, and surround us with content from relatively homogenous groups.75 As
endorsements and shares accumulate, the chances for an algorithmic boost
increase. After seeing friends’ recommendations online, individuals tend to pass
on those recommendations to their own networks.76 Because people tend to share
information with which they agree, social media users are surrounded by
information confirming their preexisting beliefs.77 This is what we mean by
“filter bubble.”78
Filter bubbles can be powerful insulators against the influence of contrary
information. In a study of Facebook users, researchers found that individuals
reading fact-checking articles had not originally consumed the fake news at
issue, and those who consumed fake news in the first place almost never read a
fact-check that might debunk it.79
Taken together, common cognitive biases and social media capabilities are
behind the viral spread of falsehoods and decay of truth. They have helped
entrench what amounts to information tribalism, and the results plague public
and private discourse. Information cascades, natural attraction to negative and
novel information, and filter bubbles provide an all-too-welcoming environment
as deep-fake capacities mature and proliferate.
II.
COSTS AND BENEFITS
Deep-fake technology can and will be used for a wide variety of purposes.
Not all will be antisocial; some, in fact, will be profoundly prosocial.

72. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 68.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 67.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Political scientists Andrew Guess, Brendan Nyhan, and Jason Reifler studied the production
and consumption of fake news on Facebook during the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. According to
the study, filter bubbles were deep (with one in four individuals visiting from fake news websites), but
narrow (the majority of fake news group consumption was concentrated among 10% of the public). See
ANDREW GUESS ET AL., SELECTIVE EXPOSURE TO MISINFORMATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE
CONSUMPTION OF FAKE NEWS DURING THE 2016 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 1 (2018)
https://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/fake-news-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3VF-JVCL].
79. See id. at 11.
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Nevertheless, deep fakes can inflict a remarkable array of harms, many of which
are exacerbated by features of the information environment explored above.
A. Beneficial Uses of Deep-Fake Technology
Human ingenuity no doubt will conceive many beneficial uses for deepfake technology. For now, the most obvious possibilities for beneficial uses fall
under the headings of education, art, and the promotion of individual autonomy.
1. Education
Deep-fake technology creates an array of opportunities for educators,
including the ability to provide students with information in compelling ways
relative to traditional means like readings and lectures. This is similar to an
earlier wave of educational innovation made possible by increasing access to
ordinary video.80 With deep fakes, it will be possible to manufacture videos of
historical figures speaking directly to students, giving an otherwise unappealing
lecture a new lease on life.81
Creating modified content will raise interesting questions about intellectual
property protections and the reach of the fair use exemption. Setting those
obstacles aside, the educational benefits of deep fakes are appealing from a
pedagogical perspective in much the same way that is true for the advent of
virtual and augmented reality production and viewing technologies.82
The technology opens the door to relatively cheap and accessible
production of video content that alters existing films or shows, particularly on
the audio track, to illustrate a pedagogical point. For example, a scene from a
war film could be altered to make it seem that a commander and her legal advisor
are discussing application of the laws of war, when in the original the dialogue
had nothing to do with that—and the scene could be re-run again and again with
modifications to the dialogue tracking changes to the hypothetical scenario under

80. Emily Cruse, Using Educational Video in the Classroom: Theory, Research, and Practice,
1-2
(2013)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://www.safarimontage.com/pdfs/training/UsingEducationalVideoInTheClassroom.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AJ8Q-WZP4].
81. Face2Face is a real-time face capture and reenactment software developed by researchers at
the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, the Max-Planck-Institute for Informatics, and Stanford
University. The applications of this technology could reinvent the way students learn about historical
events and figures. See Justus Thies et al., Face2Face: Real-time Face Capture and Reenactment of RGB
Videos
(June
2016)
(29th
IEEE-CVPR
2016
conference
paper),
http://www.graphics.stanford.edu/~niessner/papers/2016/1facetoface/thies2016face.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S94K-DPU5].
82. Adam Evans, Pros and Cons of Virtual Reality in the Classroom, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(Apr.
8,
2018),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/ProsCons-of-Virtual/243016
[https://perma.cc/TN84-89SQ].
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consideration. If done well, it would surely beat just having the professor asking
students to imagine the shifting scenario out of whole cloth.83
The educational value of deep fakes will extend beyond the classroom. In
the spring of 2018, Buzzfeed provided an apt example when it circulated a video
that appeared to feature Barack Obama warning of the dangers of deep-fake
technology itself.84 One can imagine deep fakes deployed to support educational
campaigns by public-interest organizations such as Mothers Against Drunk
Driving.
2. Art
The potential artistic benefits of deep-fake technology relate to its
educational benefits, though they need not serve any formal educational purpose.
Thanks to the use of existing technologies that resurrect dead performers for
fresh roles, the benefits to creativity are already familiar to mass audiences.85 For
example, the startling appearance of the long-dead Peter Cushing as the
venerable Grand Moff Tarkin in 2016’s Rogue One was made possible by a deft
combination of live acting and technical wizardry. That prominent illustration
delighted some and upset others.86 The Star Wars contribution to this theme
continued in The Last Jedi when Carrie Fisher’s death led the filmmakers to fake
additional dialogue using snippets from real recordings.87
Not all artistic uses of deep-fake technologies will have commercial
potential. Artists may find it appealing to express ideas through deep fakes,
including, but not limited to, productions showing incongruities between
apparent speakers and their apparent speech. Video artists might use deep-fake
technology to satirize, parody, and critique public figures and public officials.
Activists could use deep fakes to demonstrate their point in a way that words
alone could not.
3. Autonomy
Just as art overlaps with education, deep fakes implicate self-expression.
But not all uses of deep fakes for self-expression are best understood as art. Some

83. The facial animation software CrazyTalk, by Reallusion, animates faces from photographs
or cartoons and can be used by educators to further pedagogical goals. The software is available at
https://www.reallusion.com/crazytalk/default.html [https://perma.cc/TTX8-QMJP].
84. See Choi, supra note 16.
85. Indeed, film contracts now increasingly address future uses of a person’s image in
subsequent films via deep fake technology in the event of their death.
86. Dave Itzkoff, How ‘Rogue One’ Brought Back Familiar Faces, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/27/movies/how-rogue-one-brought-back-grand-moff-tarkin.html
[https://perma.cc/F53C-TDYV].
87. Evan Narcisse, It Took Some Movie Magic to Complete Carrie Fisher’s Leia Dialogue in
The Last Jedi, GIZMODO (Dec. 8, 2017), https://io9.gizmodo.com/it-took-some-movie-magic-tocomplete-carrie-fishers-lei-1821121635 [https://perma.cc/NF5H-GPJF].
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may be used to facilitate “avatar” experiences for a variety of self-expressive
ends that might best be described in terms of autonomy.
Perhaps most notably, deep-fake audio technology holds promise to restore
the ability of persons suffering from certain forms of paralysis, such as ALS, to
speak with their own voice.88 Separately, individuals suffering from certain
physical disabilities might interpose their faces and that of consenting partners
into pornographic videos, enabling virtual engagement with an aspect of life
unavailable to them in a conventional sense.89
The utility of deep-fake technology for avatar experiences, which need not
be limited to sex, closely relates to more familiar examples of technology. Video
games, for example, enable a person to have or perceive experiences that might
otherwise be impossible, dangerous, or otherwise undesirable if pursued in
person. The customizable avatars from Nintendo Wii (known as “Mii”) provide
a familiar and non-threatening example. The video game example underscores
that the avatar scenario is not always a serious matter, and sometimes boils down
to no more and no less than the pursuit of happiness.
Deep-fake technology confers the ability to integrate more realistic
simulacrums of one’s own self into an array of media, thus producing a stronger
avatar effect. For some aspects of the pursuit of autonomy, this will be a very
good thing (as the book and film Ready Player One suggests, albeit with
reference to a vision of advanced virtual reality rather than deep-fake
technology). Not so for others, however. Indeed, as we describe below, the
prospects for the harmful use of deep-fake technology are legion.
B. Harmful Uses of Deep-Fake Technology
Human ingenuity, alas, is not limited to applying technology to beneficial
ends. Like any technology, deep fakes also will be used to cause a broad
spectrum of serious harms, many of them exacerbated by the combination of
networked information systems and cognitive biases described above.
1. Harm to Individuals or Organizations
Lies about what other people have said or done are as old as human society,
and come in many shapes and sizes. Some merely irritate or embarrass, while
others humiliate and destroy; some spur violence. All of this will be true with
deep fakes as well, only more so due to their inherent credibility and the manner

88. Sima Shakeri, Lyrebird Helps ALS Ice Bucket Challenge Co-Founder Pat Quinn Get His
Voice Back: Project Revoice Can Change Lives, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 14, 2018),
https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2018/04/14/lyrebird-helps-als-ice-bucket-challenge-co-founder-patquinn-get-his-voice-back_a_23411403 [https://perma.cc/R5SD-Y37Y].
89. See Allie Volpe, Deepfake Porn has Terrifying Implications. But What if it Could Be Used
(Apr.
13,
2018),
https://www.menshealth.com/sexfor
Good?,
MEN’S HEALTH
women/a19755663/deepfakes-porn-reddit-pornhub [https://perma.cc/EFX9-2BUE].
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in which they hide the liar’s creative role. Deep fakes will emerge as powerful
mechanisms for some to exploit and sabotage others.
a. Exploitation
There will be no shortage of harmful exploitations. Some will be in the
nature of theft, such as stealing people’s identities to extract financial or some
other benefit. Others will be in the nature of abuse, commandeering a person’s
identity to harm them or individuals who care about them. And some will involve
both dimensions, whether the person creating the fake so intended or not.
As an example of extracting value, consider the possibilities for the realm
of extortion. Blackmailers might use deep fakes to extract something of value
from people, even those who might normally have little or nothing to fear in this
regard, who (quite reasonably) doubt their ability to debunk the fakes
persuasively, or who fear that any debunking would fail to reach far and fast
enough to prevent or undo the initial damage.90 In that case, victims might be
forced to provide money, business secrets, or nude images or videos (a practice
known as sextortion) to prevent the release of the deep fakes.91 Likewise,
fraudulent kidnapping claims might prove more effective in extracting ransom
when backed by video or audio appearing to depict a victim who is not in fact in
the fraudster’s control.
Not all value extraction takes a tangible form. Deep-fake technology can
also be used to exploit an individual’s sexual identity for other’s gratification.92
Thanks to deep-fake technology, an individual’s face, voice, and body can be
swapped into real pornography.93 A subreddit (now closed) featured deep-fake
sex videos of female celebrities and amassed more than 100,000 users.94 As one
Reddit user asked, “I want to make a porn video with my ex-girlfriend. But I

90. See generally ADAM DODGE & ERICA JOHNSTONE, USING FAKE VIDEO TECHNOLOGY TO
PERPETUATE INTIMATE PARTNER ABUSE 6 (2018), http://withoutmyconsent.org/blog/new-advisoryhelps-domestic-violence-survivors-prevent-and-stop-deepfake-abuse [https://perma.cc/K3Y2-XG2Q]
(discussing how deep fakes used as black mail of an intimate partner could violate the California Family
Code). The advisory was published by the non-profit organization Without My Consent, which combats
online invasions of privacy.
91. Sextortion thrives on the threat that the extortionist will disclose sex videos or nude images
unless more nude images or videos are provided. BENAJMIN WITTES ET AL., SEXTORTION:
CYBERSECURITY, TEENAGERS, AND REMOTE SEXUAL ASSAULT (Brookings Inst. ed., 2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/sextortion1-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7K9N5W7C].
92. See DODGE & JOHNSTONE, supra note 90, at 6 (explaining the likelihood that domestic
abusers and cyber stalkers will use deep sex tapes to harm victims); Janko Roettgers, ‘Deep Fakes’ Will
(Feb.
2,
2018),
Create
Hollywood’s
Next
Sex
Tape
Scare,
VARIETY
http://variety.com/2018/digital/news/hollywood-sex-tapes-deepfakes-ai-1202685655
[https://perma.cc/98HQ-668G].
93. Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L. J. 1870, 1921–24 (2019) [hereinafter
Citron, Sexual Privacy].
94. DODGE & JOHNSTONE, supra note 90, at 6.
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don’t have any high-quality video with her, but I have lots of good photos.”95 A
Discord user explained that he made a “pretty good” video of a girl he went to
high school with, using around 380 photos scraped from her Instagram and
Facebook accounts.96
These examples highlight an important point: the gendered dimension of
the exploitation of deep fakes. In all likelihood, the majority of victims of fake
sex videos will be female. This has been the case for cyber stalking and nonconsensual pornography, and likely will be the case for deep-fake sex videos.97
One can easily imagine deep-fake sex videos subjecting individuals to
violent, humiliating sex acts. This shows that not all such fakes will be designed
primarily, or at all, for the creator’s sexual or financial gratification. Some will
be nothing less than cruel weapons meant to terrorize and inflict pain. Of deepfake sex videos, Mary Anne Franks has astutely said, “If you were the worst
misogynist in the world, this technology would allow you to accomplish
whatever you wanted.”98
When victims discover that they have been used in deep-fake sex videos,
the psychological damage may be profound—whether or not this was the video
creator’s aim. Victims may feel humiliated and scared.99 Deep-fake sex videos
force individuals into virtual sex, reducing them to sex objects. As Robin West
has observed, threats of sexual violence “literally, albeit not physically,
penetrates the body.”100 Deep-fake sex videos can transform rape threats into a
terrifying virtual reality. They send the message that victims can be sexually
abused at whim. Given the stigma of nude images, especially for women and
girls, individuals depicted in fake sex videos also may suffer collateral
consequences in the job market, among other places, as we explain in more detail
below in our discussion of sabotage.101
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
ASIA A. EATON ET AL., 2017 NATIONWIDE ONLINE STUDY OF NONCONSENSUAL PORN
VICTIMIZATION
AND
PERPETRATION
12
(Cyber
C.R.
Initiative
ed.,
2017),
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CCRI-2017-Research-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2HYP-7ELV] (“Women were significantly more likely [1.7 times] to have been
victims of [non-consensual porn] or to have been threatened with [non-consensual porn]. . . .”).
98. Drew Harwell, Fake-Porn Videos Are Being Weaponized to Harass and Humiliate Women:
POST
(Dec.
30,
2018),
‘Everybody
is
a
Potential
Target’,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/12/30/fake-porn-videos-are-being-weaponizedharass-humiliate-women-everybody-is-potential-target/?utm_term=.936bfc339777
[https://perma.cc/D37Y-DPXB].
99. See generally Rana Ayyub, In India, Journalists Face Slut-Shaming and Rape Threats, N.Y.
TIMES (May 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/opinion/india-journalists-slut-shamingrape.html [https://perma.cc/A7WR-PF6L]; ‘I Couldn’t Talk or Sleep for Three Days’: Journalist Rana
Ayyub’s Horrific Social Media Ordeal over Fake Tweet, Daily O (Apr. 26, 2018),
https://www.dailyo.in/variety/rana-ayyub-trolling-fake-tweet-social-media-harassmenthindutva/story/1/23733.html [https://perma.cc/J6G6-H6GZ].
100. ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 102–03 (1997) (emphasis omitted).
101. Deep-fake sex videos should be considered in light of the broader cyber stalking
phenomenon, which more often targets women and usually involves online assaults that are sexually
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These examples are but the tip of a disturbing iceberg. Like sexualized deep
fakes, imagery depicting non-sexual abuse or violence might also be used to
threaten, intimidate, and inflict psychological harm on the depicted victim (or
those who care for that person). Deep fakes also might be used to portray
someone, falsely, as endorsing a product, service, idea, or politician. Other forms
of exploitation will abound.
b. Sabotage
In addition to inflicting direct psychological harm on victims, deep-fake
technology can be used to harm victims along other dimensions due to their
utility for reputational sabotage. Across every field of competition—workplace,
romance, sports, marketplace, and politics—people will have the capacity to deal
significant blows to the prospects of their rivals.
It could mean the loss of romantic opportunity, the support of friends, the
denial of a promotion, the cancellation of a business opportunity, and beyond.
Deep-fake videos could depict a person destroying property in a drunken rage.
They could show people stealing from a store; yelling vile, racist epithets; using
drugs; or any manner of antisocial or embarrassing behavior like sounding
incoherent. Depending on the circumstances, timing, and circulation of the fake,
the effects could be devastating.
In some instances, debunking the fake may come too late to remedy the
initial harm. For example, consider how a rival might torpedo the draft position
of a top pro sports prospect by releasing a compromising deep-fake video just as
the draft begins. Even if the video is later doubted as a fake, it could be
impossible to undo the consequences (which might involve the loss of millions
of dollars) because once cautious teams make other picks, the victim may fall
into later rounds of the draft (or out of the draft altogether).102
The nature of today’s communication environment enhances the capacity
of deep fakes to cause reputational harm. The combination of cognitive biases
and algorithmic boosting increases the chances for salacious fakes to circulate.
The ease of copying and storing data online—including storage in remote
jurisdictions—makes it much harder to eliminate fakes once they are posted and
shared. These considerations combined with the ever-improving search engines
increase the chances that employers, business partners, or romantic interests will
encounter the fake.
threatening and sexually demeaning. See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 13–
19.
102. This hypothetical is modeled on an actual event, albeit one involving a genuine rather than
a falsified compromising video. In 2016, a highly regarded NFL prospect named Laremy Tunsill may
have lost as much as $16 million when, on the verge of the NFL draft, someone released a video showing
him smoking marijuana with a bong and gas mask. See Jack Holmes, A Hacker’s Tweet May Have Cost
(Apr.
29,
2016),
This
NFL
Prospect
Almost
$16
Million,
ESQUIRE
https://www.esquire.com/sports/news/a44457/laremy-tunsil-nfl-draft-weed-lost-millions
[https://perma.cc/7PEL-PRBF].
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Once discovered, deep fakes can be devastating to those searching for
employment. Search results matter to employers.103 According to a 2009
Microsoft study, more than 90 percent of employers use search results to make
decisions about candidates, and in more than 77 percent of cases, those results
have a negative result. As the study explained, employers often decline to
interview or hire people because their search results featured “inappropriate
photos.”104 The reason for those results should be obvious. It is less risky and
expensive to hire people who do not have the baggage of damaged online
reputations. This is especially true in fields where the competition for jobs is
steep.105 There is little reason to think the dynamics would be significantly
different with respect to romantic prospects.106
Deep fakes can be used to sabotage business competitors. Deep-fake videos
could show a rival company’s chief executive engaged in any manner of
disreputable behavior, from purchasing illegal drugs to hiring underage
prostitutes to uttering racial epithets to bribing government officials. Deep fakes
could be released just in time to interfere with merger discussions or bids for
government contracts. As with the sports draft example, mundane business
opportunities could be thwarted even if the videos are ultimately exposed as
fakes.

103. Number of Employers Using Social Media to Screen Candidates at All-Time High, Finds
Latest CareerBuilder Study, CAREERBUILDER: PRESS ROOM (June 15, 2017),
http://press.careerbuilder.com/2017-06-15-Number-of-Employers-Using-Social-Media-to-ScreenCandidates-at-All-Time-High-Finds-Latest-CareerBuilder-Study
[https://perma.cc/K6BD-DYSV]
(noting that a national survey conducted in 2017 found that over half of employers will not hire a
candidate without an online presence and may choose not to hire a candidate based on negative social
media content).
104. This has been the case for nude photos posted without consent, often known as revenge
porn. See generally CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 17–18, 48–49 (exploring
the economic fallout of the nonconsensual posting of someone’s nude image); Mary Anne Franks,
“Revenge Porn” Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1251, 1308–23 (2017). For
recent examples, see Tasneem Nashrulla, A Middle School Teacher Was Fired After a Student Obtained
Her Topless Selfie. Now She is Suing the School District for Gender Discrimination, BUZZFEED (Apr.
4.
2019),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/tasneemnashrulla/middle-school-teacher-firedtopless-selfie-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/3PGZ-CZ5R]; Annie Seifullah, Revenge Porn Took My Career.
The Law Couldn’t Get It Back, JEZEBEL (July 18, 2018), https://jezebel.com/revenge-porn-took-mycareer-the-law-couldnt-get-it-bac-1827572768 [https://perma.cc/D9Y8-63WH].
105. See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 345, 352–53 (2014) (“Most employers rely on candidates’ online reputations as an
employment screen.”).
106. Journalist Rana Ayuub, who faced vicious online abuse including her image in deep-fake
sex videos, explained that the deep fakes seemed designed to label her as “promiscuous,” “immoral,”
and damaged goods. Ayyub, supra note 99. See generally Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 93, at
1925–26 (discussing how victims of deep-fake sex videos felt crippled and unable to talk or eat, let alone
engage with others); Danielle Keats Citron, Why Sexual Privacy Matters for Trust, WASH. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (recounting fear of dating and embarrassment experienced by individuals whose nude
photos were disclosed online without consent).
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2. Harm to Society
Deep fakes are not just a threat to specific individuals or entities. They have
the capacity to harm society in a variety of ways. Consider the following:
 Fake videos could feature public officials taking bribes,
displaying racism, or engaging in adultery.
 Politicians and other government officials could appear in
locations where they were not, saying or doing things that they
did not.107
 Fake audio or video could involve damaging campaign material
that claims to emanate from a political candidate when it does
not.108
 Fake videos could place them in meetings with spies or
criminals, launching public outrage, criminal investigations, or
both.
 Soldiers could be shown murdering innocent civilians in a war
zone, precipitating waves of violence and even strategic harms
to a war effort.109
 A deep fake might falsely depict a white police officer shooting
an unarmed black man while shouting racial epithets.
 A fake audio clip might “reveal” criminal behavior by a
candidate on the eve of an election.
 Falsified video appearing to show a Muslim man at a local
mosque celebrating the Islamic State could stoke distrust of, or
even violence against, that community.
 A fake video might portray an Israeli official doing or saying
something so inflammatory as to cause riots in neighboring
countries, potentially disrupting diplomatic ties or sparking a
wave of violence.
 False audio might convincingly depict U.S. officials privately
“admitting” a plan to commit an outrage overseas, timed to
disrupt an important diplomatic initiative.
 A fake video might depict emergency officials “announcing”
an impending missile strike on Los Angeles or an emergent
pandemic in New York City, provoking panic and worse.
107. See, e.g., Linton Weeks, A Very Weird Photo of Ulysses S. Grant, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct.
27, 2015 11:03 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/npr-history-dept/2015/10/27/452089384/a-veryweird-photo-of-ulysses-s-grant [https://perma.cc/F3U6-WRVF] (discussing a doctored photo of
Ulysses S. Grant from the Library of Congress archives that was created over 100 years ago).
108. For powerful work on the potential damage of deep-fake campaign speech, see Rebecca
Green, Counterfeit Campaign Speech, 70 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2019).
109. Cf. Vindu Goel and Sheera Frenkel, In India Election, False Posts and Hate Speech
TIMES
(Apr.
1,
2019),
Flummox
Facebook,
N.Y
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/01/technology/india-elections-facebook.html
[https://perma.cc/55AW-X6Q3].
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As these scenarios suggest, the threats posed by deep fakes have systemic
dimensions. The damage may extend to, among other things, distortion of
democratic discourse on important policy questions; manipulation of elections;
erosion of trust in significant public and private institutions; enhancement and
exploitation of social divisions; harm to specific military or intelligence
operations or capabilities; threats to the economy; and damage to international
relations.
a. Distortion of Democratic Discourse
Public discourse on questions of policy currently suffers from the
circulation of false information.110 Sometimes lies are intended to undermine the
credibility of participants in such debates, and sometimes lies erode the factual
foundation that ought to inform policy discourse. Even without prevalent deep
fakes, information pathologies abound. But deep fakes will exacerbate matters
by raising the stakes for the “fake news” phenomenon in dramatic fashion (quite
literally).111
Many actors will have sufficient interest to exploit the capacity of deep
fakes to skew information and thus manipulate beliefs. As recent actions by the
Russian government demonstrate, state actors sometimes have such interests.112
Other actors will do it as a form of unfair competition in the battle of ideas. And
others will do it simply as a tactic of intellectual vandalism and fraud. The
combined effects may be significant, including but not limited to the disruption
of elections. But elections are vulnerable to deep fakes in a separate and
distinctive way as well, as we will explore in the next section.
Democratic discourse is most functional when debates build from a
foundation of shared facts and truths supported by empirical evidence.113 In the
absence of an agreed upon reality, efforts to solve national and global problems
become enmeshed in needless first-order questions like whether climate change
is real.114 The large-scale erosion of public faith in data and statistics has led us
110. See Steve Lohr, It’s True: False News Spreads Faster and Wider. And Humans Are to
Blame, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/08/technology/twitter-fakenews-research.html [https://perma.cc/AB74-CUWV].
111. Franklin Foer, The Era of Fake Video Begins, ATLANTIC (May 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/05/realitys-end/556877 [https://perma.cc/RX2AX8EE] (“Fabricated videos will create new and understandable suspicions about everything we watch.
Politicians and publicists will exploit those doubts. When captured in a moment of wrongdoing, a culprit
will simply declare the visual evidence a malicious concoction.”).
112. Charlie Warzel, 2017 Was the Year Our Internet Destroyed Our Shared Reality, BUZZFEED
(Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.buzzfeed.com/charliewarzel/2017-year-the-Internet-destroyed-sharedreality?utm_term=.nebaDjYmj [https://perma.cc/8WWS-UC8K].
113. Mark Verstraete & Derek E. Bambauer, Ecosystem of Distrust, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
129, 152 (2017). For powerful scholarship on how lies undermine culture of trust, see SEANA
VALENTINE SHRIFFIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE LAW (2014).
114. Verstraete & Bambauer, supra note 113, at 144 (“Trust in data and statistics is a precondition
to being able to resolve disputes about the world—they allow participants in policy debates to operate
at least from a shared reality.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3213954

1778

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107:1753

to a point where the simple introduction of empirical evidence can alienate those
who have come to view statistics as elitist.115 Deep fakes will allow individuals
to live in their own subjective realities, where beliefs can be supported by
manufactured “facts.” When basic empirical insights provoke heated
contestation, democratic discourse has difficulty proceeding. In a marketplace of
ideas flooded with deep-fake videos and audio, truthful facts will have difficulty
emerging from the scrum.
b. Manipulation of Elections
In addition to the ability of deep fakes to inject visual and audio falsehoods
into policy debates, a deeply convincing variation of a long-standing problem in
politics, deep fakes can enable a particularly disturbing form of sabotage:
distribution of a damaging, but false, video or audio about a political candidate.
The potential to sway the outcome of an election is real, particularly if the
attacker is able to time the distribution such that there will be enough window
for the fake to circulate but not enough window for the victim to debunk it
effectively (assuming it can be debunked at all). In this respect, the election
scenario is akin to the NBA draft scenario described earlier. Both involve
decisional chokepoints: narrow windows of time during which irrevocable
decisions are made, and during which the circulation of false information
therefore may have irremediable effects.
The 2017 election in France illustrates the perils. In this variant of the
operation executed against the Clinton campaign in the United States in 2016,
the Russians mounted a covert-action program that blended cyber-espionage and
information manipulation in an effort to prevent the election of Emmanuel
Macron as President of France in 2017.116 The campaign included theft of large
numbers of digital communications and documents, alteration of some of those
documents in hopes of making them seem problematic, and dumping a lot of
them on the public alongside aggressive spin. The effort ultimately fizzled for
many reasons, including: poor tradecraft that made it easy to trace the attack;
smart defensive work by the Macron team, which planted their own false
documents throughout their own system to create a smokescreen of distrust; a
lack of sufficiently provocative material despite an effort by the Russians to
engineer scandal by altering some of the documents prior to release; and
mismanagement of the timing of the document dump, which left enough time for
the Macron team and the media to discover and point out all these flaws.117

115. Id.
116. See Aurelien Breeden et al., Macron Campaign Says It Was Target of ‘Massive’ Hacking
Attack, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/world/europe/france-macronhacking.html [https://perma.cc/4RC8-PV5G].
117. See, e.g., Adam Nossiter et al., Hackers Came, But the French Were Prepared, N.Y. TIMES
(May 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/world/europe/hackers-came-but-the-frenchwere-prepared.html [https://perma.cc/P3EW-H5ZY].
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It was a bullet dodged, yes, but a bullet nonetheless. The Russians could
have acted with greater care, both in terms of timing and tradecraft. They could
have produced a more-damning fake document, for example, dropping it just as
polls opened. Worse, they could have distributed a deep fake consisting of
seemingly-real video or audio evidence persuasively depicting Macron speaking
or doing something shocking.
This version of the deep-fake threat is not limited to state-sponsored covert
action. States may have a strong incentive to develop and deploy such tools to
sway elections, but there will be no shortage of non-state actors and individuals
motivated to do the same. The limitation on such interventions has much more
to do with means than motive, as things currently stand. The diffusion of the
capacity to produce high-quality deep fakes will erode that limitation,
empowering an ever-widening circle of participants to inject false-butcompelling information into a ready and willing information-sharing
environment. If executed and timed well enough, such interventions are bound
to tip an outcome sooner or later—and in a larger set of cases they will at least
cast a shadow of illegitimacy over the election process itself.
c.

Eroding Trust in Institutions

Deep fakes will erode trust in a wide range of both public and private
institutions and such trust will become harder to maintain. The list of public
institutions for which this will matter runs the gamut, including elected officials,
appointed officials, judges, juries, legislators, staffers, and agencies. One can
readily imagine, in the current climate especially, a fake-but-viral video
purporting to show FBI special agents discussing ways to abuse their authority
to pursue a Trump family member. Conversely, we might see a fraudulent video
of ICE officers speaking with racist language about immigrants or acting cruelly
towards a detained child. Particularly where strong narratives of distrust already
exist, provocative deep fakes will find a primed audience.
Private sector institutions will be just as vulnerable. If an institution has a
significant voice or role in society, whether nationally or locally, it is a potential
target. More to the point, such institutions already are subject to reputational
attacks, but soon will have to face abuse in the form of deep fakes that are harder
to debunk and more likely to circulate widely. Religious institutions are an
obvious target, as are politically-engaged entities ranging from Planned
Parenthood to the NRA.118

118. Recall that the Center for Medical Progress released videos of Planned Parenthood officials
that Planned Parenthood argued had been deceptively edited to embarrass the organization. See, e.g.,
Jackie Calmes, Planned Parenthood Videos Were Altered, Analysis Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/28/us/abortion-planned-parenthood-videos.html
[https://perma.cc/G52X-V8ND]. Imagine the potential for deep fakes designed for such a purpose.
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d. Exacerbating Social Divisions
The institutional examples relate closely to significant cleavages in
American society involving identity and policy commitments. Indeed, this is
what makes institutions attractive targets for falsehoods. As divisions become
entrenched, the likelihood that opponents will believe negative things about the
other side—and that some will be willing to spread lies towards that end—
grows.119 However, institutions will not be the only ones targeted with deep
fakes. We anticipate that deep fakes will reinforce and exacerbate the underlying
social divisions that fueled them in the first place.
Some have argued that this was the actual—or at least the original—goal
of the Russian covert action program involving intervention in American politics
in 2016. The Russians may have intended to enhance American social divisions
as a general proposition, rendering us less capable of forming consensus on
important policy questions and thus more distracted by internal squabbles.120
Texas is illustrative.121 Russia promoted conspiracy theories about federal
military power during the innocuous, “Jade Helm” training exercises.122 Russian
operators organized an event in Houston to protest radical Islam and a counterprotest of that event;123 they also promoted a Texas independence movement.124
Deep fakes will strengthen the hand of those who seek to divide us in this way.
Deep fakes will not merely add fuel to the fire sustaining divisions. In some
instances, the emotional punch of a fake video or audio might accomplish a
degree of mobilization-to-action that written words alone could not.125 Consider

119. See Brian E. Weeks, Emotions, Partisanship, and Misperceptions: How Anger and Anxiety
Moderate the Effect of Partisan Bias on Susceptibility to Political Misinformation, 65 J. COMM. 699,
711–15 (2015) (discussing how political actors can spread political misinformation by recognizing and
exploiting common human emotional states).
120. JON WHITE, DISMISS, DISTORT, DISTRACT, AND DISMAY: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN
RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION (Inst. for European Studies ed. 2016), https://www.ies.be/node/3689
[https://perma.cc/P889-768J].
121. The CalExit campaign is another illustration of Russian disinformation campaign. ‘Russian
Trolls’ Promoted California Independence, BBC (Nov. 4, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/blogstrending-41853131 [https://perma.cc/68Q8-KNDG].
122. Cassandra Pollock & Alex Samuels, Hysteria Over Jade Helm Exercise in Texas Was
Fueled by Russians, Former CIA Director Says, TEX. TRIB. (May 3, 2018),
https://www.texastribune.org/2018/05/03/hysteria-over-jade-helm-exercise-texas-was-fueled-russiansformer-cia [https://perma.cc/BU2Y-E7EY].
123. Scott Shane, How Unwitting Americans Encountered Russian Operatives Online, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/18/us/politics/russian-operatives-facebooktwitter.html [https://perma.cc/4C8Y-STP7].
124. Casey Michel, How the Russians Pretended to Be Texans—And Texans Believed Them,
POST
(Oct.
17,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracyWASH.
post/wp/2017/10/17/how-the-russians-pretended-to-be-texans-and-texans-believedthem/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4730a395a684 [https://perma.cc/3Q7V-8YZK].
125. The “Pizzagate” conspiracy theory is a perfect example. There, an individual stormed a D.C.
restaurant with a gun because online stories falsely claimed that Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton
ran a child sex exploitation ring out of its basement. See Marc Fisher et al., Pizzagate: From Rumor, to
POST
(Dec.
6,
2016),
Hashtag,
to
Gunfire
in
D.C.,
WASH.
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a situation of fraught, race-related tensions involving a police force and a local
community. A sufficiently inflammatory deep fake depicting a police officer
using racial slurs, shooting an unarmed person, or both could set off substantial
civil unrest, riots, or worse. Of course, the same deep fake might be done in
reverse, falsely depicting a community leader calling for violence against the
police. Such events would impose intangible costs by sharpening societal
divisions, as well as tangible costs for those tricked into certain actions and those
suffering from those actions.
e.

Undermining Public Safety

The foregoing example illustrates how a deep fake might be used to
enhance social divisions and to spark actions—even violence—that fray our
social fabric. But note, too, how deep fakes can undermine public safety.
A century ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes warned of the danger of
falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater.126 Now, false cries in the form of deep
fakes go viral, fueled by the persuasive power of hyper-realistic evidence in
conjunction with the distribution powers of social media.127 The panic and
damage Holmes imagined may be modest in comparison to the potential unrest
and destruction created by a well-timed deep fake.128
In the best-case scenario, real public panic might simply entail economic
harms and hassles. In the worst-case scenario, it might involve property
destruction, personal injuries, and/or death. Deep fakes increase the chances that
someone can induce a public panic.
They might not even need to capitalize on social divisions to do so. In early
2018, we saw a glimpse of how a panic might be caused through ordinary human
error when an employee of Hawaii’s Emergency Management Agency issued a

https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/pizzagate-from-rumor-to-hashtag-to-gunfire-indc/2016/12/06/4c7def50-bbd4-11e6-94ac-3d324840106c_story.html [https://perma.cc/FV7W-PC9W].
126. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (“The most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic.”).
127. Cass R, Sunstein, Constitutional Caution, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 361, 365 (1996) (“It may
well be that the easy transmission of such material to millions of people will justify deference to
reasonable legislative judgments.”).
128. In our keynote at the University of Maryland Law Review symposium inspired by this
article, we brought the issue close to home (for one of us) in Baltimore—the death of Freddie Gray while
he was in policy custody. We asked the audience: “Imagine if a deep-fake video appeared of the police
officers responsible for Mr. Gray’s death in which they said they were ordered to kill Mr. Gray. As most
readers know, the day after Mr. Gray’s death was characterized by protests and civil unrest. If such a
deep-fake video had appeared and gone viral, we might have seen far more violence and disruption in
Baltimore. If the timing was just right and the video sufficiently inflammatory, we might have seen
greater destruction of property and possibly of lives.” Robert Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron, 21st
Century Style Truth Decay: Deep Fakes and the Challenge for Privacy, Free Expression, and National
Security, 78 MD. L. REV. 887 (2019); see also Maryland Carey Law, Truth Decay– Maryland Law
(Feb.
6,
2019),
Review
Keynote
Symposium
Address,
YOUTUBE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WrYlKHiWv2c [https://perma.cc/T28M-ZBBN].
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warning to the public about an incoming ballistic missile.129 Less widely noted,
we saw purposeful attempts to induce panic when the Russian Internet Research
Agency mounted a sophisticated and well-resourced campaign to create the
appearance of a chemical disaster in Louisiana and an Ebola outbreak in
Atlanta.130 There was real but limited harm in both of these cases, though the
stories did not spread far because they lacked evidence and the facts were easy
to check.
We will not always be so lucky as malicious attempts to spread panic grow.
Deep fakes will prove especially useful for such disinformation campaigns,
enhancing their credibility. Imagine if the Atlanta Ebola story had been backed
by compelling fake audio appearing to capture a phone conversation with the
head of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention describing terrifying
facts and calling for a cover-up to keep the public calm.
f.

Undermining Diplomacy

Deep fakes will also disrupt diplomatic relations and roil international
affairs, especially where the fake is circulated publicly and galvanizes public
opinion. The recent Saudi-Qatari crisis might have been fueled by a hack that
injected fake stories with fake quotes by Qatar’s emir into a Qatari news site.131
The manipulator behind the lie could then further support the fraud with
convincing video and audio clips purportedly gathered by and leaked from some
unnamed intelligence agency.
A deep fake put into the hands of a state’s intelligence apparatus may or
may not prompt a rash action. After all, the intelligence agencies of the most
capable governments are in a good position to make smart decisions about what
weight to give potential fakes. But not every state has such capable institutions,
and, in any event, the real utility of a deep fake for purposes of sparking an
international incident lies in inciting the public in one or more states to believe
that something shocking really did occur or was said. Deep fakes thus might best
be used to box in a government through inflammation of relevant public opinion,
constraining the government’s options, and perhaps forcing its hand in some
particular way. Recalling the concept of decisional chokepoints, for example, a
well-timed deep fake calculated to inflame public opinion might be circulated
during a summit meeting, making it politically untenable for one side to press its

129. Cecilia Kang, Hawaii Missile Alert Wasn’t Accidental, Officials Say, Blaming Worker, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/30/technology/fcc-hawaii-missile-alert.html
[https://perma.cc/4M39-C492].
2,
2015),
130. Adrian
Chen,
The
Agency, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html [https://perma.cc/DML3-6MWT].
131. Krishnadev Calamur, Did Russian Hackers Target Qatar?, ATLANTIC (June 6, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/06/qatar-russian-hacker-fake-news/529359
[https://perma.cc/4QAW-TLY8] (discussing how Russian hackers may have planted a fake news story
on a Qatari news site that falsely suggested that the Qatari Emir had praised Iran and expressed interest
in peace with Israel).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3213954

2019]

DEEP FAKES

1783

agenda as it otherwise would have, or making it too costly to reach and announce
some particular agreement.
g. Jeopardizing National Security
The use of deep fakes to endanger public safety or disrupt international
relations can also be viewed as harming national security. But what else belongs
under that heading?
Military activity—especially combat operations—belongs under this
heading as well, and there is considerable utility for deep fakes in that setting.
Most obviously, deep fakes have utility as a form of disinformation supporting
strategic, operational, or even tactical deception. This is a familiar aspect of
warfare, famously illustrated by the efforts of the Allies in Operation Bodyguard
to mislead the Axis regarding the location of what became the D-Day invasion
of June 1944.132 In that sense, deep fakes will be (or already are) merely another
instrument in the toolkit for wartime deception, one that combatants will both
use and have used against them.
Critically, deep fakes may prove to have special impact when it comes to
the battle for hearts and minds where a military force is occupying or at least
operating amidst a civilian population, as was the case for the U.S. military for
many years in Iraq and even now in Afghanistan. In that context, we have long
seen contending claims about civilian casualties—including, at times, the use of
falsified evidence to that effect. Deep fakes are certain to be used to make such
claims more credible. At times, this will merely have a general impact in the
larger battle of narratives. Nevertheless, such general impacts can matter a great
deal in the long term and can spur enemy recruitment or enhance civilian support
to the enemy. And, at times, it will spark specific violent reactions. One can
imagine circulation of a deep-fake video purporting to depict American soldiers
killing local civilians and seeming to say disparaging things about Islam in the
process, precipitating an attack by civilians or even a host-state soldier or police
officer against nearby U.S. persons.
Deep fakes pose similar problems for the activities of intelligence agencies.
The experience of the United States since the Snowden leaks in 2013
demonstrates that the public, both in the United States and abroad, can become
very alarmed about reports that the U.S. Intelligence Community has a particular
capability, and this can translate into significant pressure to limit or abolish that
capability both from an internal U.S. perspective and in terms of diplomatic
relations. Whether those pressures resulted in changes that went too far in the
case of the Snowden revelations is not our concern here. Our point is that this
dynamic could be exploited if one wished to create distractions for an

132. Jamie Rubin, Deception: the Other ‘D’ in D-Day, NBC NEWS: THE ABRAMS REPORT (June
5, 2004), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/5139053/ns/msnbc-the_abrams_report/t/deception-other-d-dday/#.WvQt5NMvyT8 [https://perma.cc/35HX-N7LN].
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intelligence agency or generate conditions that would lead a society to limit what
that agency is authorized to do. None of that would be easily done, but deep fakes
make the prospect of a strategic operation to bedevil a competing state’s
intelligence services more plausible.133
The list of potential national security harms associated with deep fakes can
go on, depending on one’s definition of national security. In a recent report, the
Belfer Center highlighted the national security implications of sophisticated
forgeries.134 An adversary could acquire real and sensitive documents through
cyber-espionage and release the real documents along with forgeries. Deep-fake
video and audio could be “leaked” to verify the forgeries. Foreign policy could
be changed in response to convincing deep fakes and forgeries.135
h. Undermining Journalism
As the capacity to produce deep fakes spreads, journalists increasingly will
encounter a dilemma: when someone provides video or audio evidence of a
newsworthy event, can its authenticity be trusted? That is not a novel question,
but it will be harder to answer as deep fakes proliferate. News organizations may
be chilled from rapidly reporting real, disturbing events for fear that the evidence
of them will turn out to be fake.136
It is not just a matter of honest mistakes becoming more frequent: one can
expect instances in which someone tries to trap a news organization using deep
fakes. We already have seen many examples of “stings” pursued without the
benefit of deep-fake technology.137 Convincing deep fakes will make such stings
more likely to succeed. Media entities may grow less willing to take risks in that

133. In this context, it is interesting to note the success of the Shadow Brokers operation, which
appears to have been a Russian effort not just to steal capabilities from NSA but to embarrass the NSA
through a series of taunting public releases of those capabilities. There was also some degree of
accompanying spin suggesting an interest in sowing doubt both in the U.S. and abroad about the wisdom
of allowing the NSA to develop, keep, and use such capabilities in the first place. See Scott Shane, et al.,
Security Breach and Spilled Secrets Have Shaken the N.S.A. to Its Core, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/12/us/nsa-shadow-brokers.html [https://perma.cc/WF6U-D4SV].
134. GREG ALLEN & TANIEL CHAN, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. AND INT’L
AFF.,
ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE
AND
NATIONAL
SECURITY
(July
2017),
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/AI%20NatSec%20-%20final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P4H5-QLVC].
135. Id. at 34.
136. Daniel Funke, U.S. Newsrooms are ‘Largely Unprepared’ to Address Misinformation
Online, POYNTER (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.poynter.org/news/us-newsrooms-are-largelyunprepared-address-misinformation-online [https://perma.cc/XUF4-8LLM].
137. See, e.g., Shawn Boburg, et al., A Woman Approached the Post With Dramatic—and
False—Tale About Roy Moore. She Appears to Be Part of Undercover Sting Operation, WASH. POST
(Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/a-woman-approached-the-post-withdramatic--and-false--tale-about-roy-moore-sje-appears-to-be-part-of-undercover-stingoperation/2017/11/27/0c2e335a-cfb6-11e7-9d3a-bcbe2af58c3a_story.html?utm_term=.6a4e98a07c2c
[https://perma.cc/3TKD-27BP] (discussing an attempt to trick the Washington Post into running a false
story about a woman claiming to have had sex as a teenager with and become pregnant by then-U.S.
Senate candidate Roy Moore).
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environment, or at least less willing to do so in timely fashion. Without a quick
and reliable way to authenticate video and audio, the press may find it difficult
to fulfill its ethical and moral obligation to spread truth.
i.

The Liar’s Dividend: Beware the Cry of Deep-Fake News

We conclude our survey of the harms associated with deep fakes by
flagging another possibility, one different in kind from those noted above. In
each of the preceding examples, the harm stems directly from the use of a deep
fake to convince people that fictional things really occurred. But not all lies
involve affirmative claims that something occurred (that never did): some of the
most dangerous lies take the form of denials.
Deep fakes will make it easier for liars to deny the truth in distinct ways. A
person accused of having said or done something might create doubt about the
accusation by using altered video or audio evidence that appears to contradict
the claim. This would be a high-risk strategy, though less so in situations where
the media is not involved and where no one else seems likely to have the
technical capacity to expose the fraud. In situations of resource-inequality, we
may see deep fakes used to escape accountability for the truth.
Deep fakes will prove useful in escaping the truth in another equally
pernicious way. Ironically, liars aiming to dodge responsibility for their real
words and actions will become more credible as the public becomes more
educated about the threats posed by deep fakes. Imagine a situation in which an
accusation is supported by genuine video or audio evidence. As the public
becomes more aware of the idea that video and audio can be convincingly faked,
some will try to escape accountability for their actions by denouncing authentic
video and audio as deep fakes. Put simply: a skeptical public will be primed to
doubt the authenticity of real audio and video evidence. This skepticism can be
invoked just as well against authentic as against adulterated content.
Hence what we call the liar’s dividend: this dividend flows, perversely, in
proportion to success in educating the public about the dangers of deep fakes.
The liar’s dividend would run with the grain of larger trends involving truth
skepticism. Most notably, recent years have seen mounting distrust of traditional
sources of news. That distrust has been stoked relentlessly by President Trump
and like-minded sources in television and radio; the mantra “fake news” has
become an instantly recognized shorthand for a host of propositions about the
supposed corruption and bias of a wide array of journalists, and a useful
substitute for argument when confronted with damaging factual assertions.
Whether one labels this collection of attitudes postmodernist or nihilist,138 the

138. For a useful summary of that debate, see Thomas B. Edsall, Is President Trump a Stealth
TIMES
(Jan.
25,
2018),
Postmodernist
or
Just
a
Liar?,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/opinion/trump-postmodernism-lies.html
[https://perma.cc/DN7F-AEPA].
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fact remains that it has made substantial inroads into public opinion in recent
years.
Against that backdrop, it is not difficult to see how “fake news” will extend
to “deep-fake news” in the future. As deep fakes become widespread, the public
may have difficulty believing what their eyes or ears are telling them—even
when the information is real. In turn, the spread of deep fakes threatens to erode
the trust necessary for democracy to function effectively.139
The combination of truth decay and trust decay accordingly creates greater
space for authoritarianism. Authoritarian regimes and leaders with authoritarian
tendencies benefit when objective truths lose their power.140 If the public loses
faith in what they hear and see and truth becomes a matter of opinion, then power
flows to those whose opinions are most prominent—empowering authorities
along the way.141
Cognitive bias will reinforce these unhealthy dynamics. As Part II explored,
people tend to believe facts that accord with our preexisting beliefs.142 As
research shows, people often ignore information that contradicts their beliefs and
interpret ambiguous evidence as consistent with their beliefs.143 People are also
inclined to accept information that pleases them when given the choice.144
Growing appreciation that deep fakes exist may provide a convenient excuse for
motivated reasoners to embrace these dynamics, even when confronted with
information that is in fact true.
III.
WHAT CAN BE DONE? EVALUATING TECHNICAL, LEGAL, AND MARKET
RESPONSES
What can be done to ameliorate these harms? Part III reviews various
possibilities. To start, we explore the prospects for technological solutions that
would facilitate the detection and debunking of deep fakes. We then describe
139. The Edelman Trust Barometer, which measures trust in institutions around the world,
recorded a drop of nine points in the Trust Index for the United States from 2017 to 2018. Even among
the informed public, the US dropped from a Trust Index of 68 to 45. 2018 EDELMAN TRUST
BAROMETER GLOBAL REPORT 7 (2018), https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/201810/2018_Edelman_Trust_Barometer_Global_Report_FEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z26M-GQ2A].
140. MILES BRUNDAGE ET AL., THE MALICIOUS USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE:
FORECASTING,
PREVENTION,
AND
MITIGATION
46
(2018)
https://www.eff.org/files/2018/02/20/malicious_ai_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2KT-XVZQ].
141. Id.
142. See generally Michela Del Vicario et al., Modeling Confirmation Bias and Polarization, 7
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS no. 40, 391 (2017) (assessing models that describe polarization effects relating to
cognitive biases).
143. See generally Constanza Villarroel et al., Arguing Against Confirmation Bias: The Effect of
Argumentative Discourse Goals on the Use of Disconfirming Evidence in Written Argument, 79 INT’L
J. EDUC. RES. 167 (2016) (demonstrating impact of biases on belief formation).
144. See generally Shanto Iyengar et al., Selective Exposure to Campaign Communication: The
Role of Anticipated Agreement and Issue Public Membership, 70 J. POL. 186 (2008) (examining impact
of bias models in the context of political campaign information).
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current and potential proposals for criminal and civil liability. With law in mind,
we discuss the role of regulators and identify ways in which the government
might respond to deep fakes. In the shadow of these possibilities, we anticipate
new services the market might spawn to protect individuals from harm associated
with deep fakes—and the considerable threat to privacy such services themselves
might entail.
A. Technological Solutions
Technology has given us deep fakes – but might it also provide us with a
capacity for debunking them and limiting their harmful potential? An efficient
and generally effective method for rapid detection of deep fakes would go far
toward resolving this topic as a matter of pressing public-policy concern.
Unfortunately, the challenges are daunting. For example, detection software
would have to keep pace with innovations in deep-fake technology to retain
efficacy. Moreover, if such technology existed and could be deployed through
social media platforms, it would only reduce the systemic harms described
above, but by no means eliminate them. Such developments might not protect
individuals from deep fakes involving narrow or even isolated distribution.145
Further, detection software might not disabuse certain people’s faith in deep
fakes, especially those under the profound sway of cognitive bias. At the least
though, the impact of harmful deep fakes might be cabined while beneficial uses
could continue unabated.
At any rate, it is far from clear that such technology will emerge in the near
future. There are a number of projects—academic and corporate—aimed at
creating counterfeit-proof systems for authenticating content or otherwise
making it easier to confirm credible provenance.146 Such systems, however, are
tailored to particular products rather than video or audio technologies generally.
They will therefore have only limited use until one program becomes ubiquitous
and effective enough for dominant platforms to incorporate them into their
content-screening systems—and, indeed, to make use of them mandatory for
posting. Additionally, these systems will have to withstand users’ efforts to
bypass them.
For now, we are left to seek a generally applicable technology that can
detect manipulated content without an expectation that the content comes with

145. GIF hosting company Gyfcat has developed and trained AI to spot fraudulent videos. Project
Maru, as they call it, can spot deep-fake videos because in many frames, the faces aren’t perfectly
rendered. They have also developed Project Angora, which “mask[s]” the face of a possible deep fake
and searches the Internet to see if the body and background footage exist elsewhere. See Louise
Matsakis, Artificial Intelligence is Now Fighting Fake Porn, WIRED (Feb. 14, 2018)
https://www.wired.com/story/gfycat-artificial-intelligence-deepfakes [https://perma.cc/PX4N-VZJY].
146. For examples of provenance technologies in development, see Dia Kayyali, Set Your Phone
to ProofMode, WITNESS, https://blog.witness.org/2017/04/proofmode-helping-prove-human-rightsabuses-world [https://perma.cc/GB6M-KQPF] (describing the concept of a metadata-rich “ProofMode”
app for Android devices).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3213954

1788

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107:1753

an internal certification. Professor Hany Farid, the pioneer of PhotoDNA, a
technology that identifies and blocks child pornography, warns: “We’re decades
away from having forensic technology that . . . [could] conclusively tell a real
from a fake . . . If you really want to fool the system you will start building into
the deepfake ways to break the forensic system.”147 The defense, in short, is
currently faring poorly in the deep-fake technology arms race.
As problems associated with deep fakes begin to accumulate, we might
expect developments that could alter the current balance of power between
technologies that create deep fakes and those that detect them. For example,
growing awareness of the problem might produce the conditions needed for
grantmaking agencies like the National Science Foundation and the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to begin steering funds toward
scalable detection systems that can be commercialized or even provided freely.
DARPA has an initial project in the form of a contest pitting GAN methods for
generating deep fakes against would-be detection algorithms. The DARPA
project manager is skeptical about the prospects for detection, however, given
current technical capacities.148
Emerging market forces might encourage companies to invest in such
capabilities on their own or in collaboration with each other and with academics
(a possibility that we revisit below). For now, however, it would be foolish to
trust that technology will deliver a debunking solution that is scalable and
reliable enough to minimize the harms deep fakes might cause.
B. Legal Solutions
If technology alone will not save us, might the law? Would a combination
of criminal and civil liability meaningfully deter and redress the harms that deep
fakes seem poised to cause? We examine the possibilities under existing and
potential law.
1. Problems with an Outright Ban
No current criminal law or civil liability regime bans the creation or
distribution of deep fakes. A threshold question is whether such a law would be
normatively appealing and, if so, constitutionally permissible.
A flat ban is not desirable because digital manipulation is not inherently
problematic. Deep fakes exact significant harm in certain contexts but not in all.
A prohibition of deep fakes would bar routine modifications that improve the

147. See Matsakis, supra note 145 (quoting Prof. Hany Farid in reference to “fake porn”).
148. See Will Knight, The U.S. Military Is Funding an Effort to Catch Deepfakes and Other AI
Trickery, MIT TECH. REV. (May 23, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/611146/the-usmilitary-is-funding-an-effort-to-catch-deepfakes-and-other-ai-trickery [https://perma.cc/7RD7-5CMJ]
(“‘Theoretically, if you gave a GAN all the techniques we know to detect it, it could pass all of those
techniques,’ says David Gunning, the DARPA program manager in charge of the project. ‘We don’t
know if there’s a limit. It’s unclear.’”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3213954

2019]

DEEP FAKES

1789

clarity of digital content. It would chill experimentation in diverse fields, from
history and science to art and education.
Crafting a law prohibiting destructive applications of deep-fake technology
while excluding beneficial ones would be difficult, but perhaps not impossible.
For example, what if a law required proof of a deep-fake creator’s intent to
deceive and evidence of serious harm as a way to reduce concerns about chilling
public discourse? Under such a proposal, concerns over speech still remain. The
very existence of a general prohibition of deep fakes, even with those guardrails,
would cast a significant shadow, potentially diminishing expression crucial to
self-governance and democratic culture. The American free speech tradition
warns against government having the power to pick winners and losers in the
realm of ideas because it will “tend to act on behalf of the ideological powers
that be.”149 As James Weinstein notes, we should be especially wary of
entrusting government officials with the power to determine the veracity of
factual claims “made in the often highly ideological context of public
discourse . . . .”150 A deep-fakes ban would raise the specter of penalties for
parodies of would-be or current office holders.
Although self-serving prosecutions are not inevitable, they are a real
possibility.151 Dislike of minority or unpopular viewpoints, combined with
ambiguity surrounding a deep-fake creator’s intent, might result in politicized
enforcement.152 This might inhibit engagement in political discourse

149. Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: The
Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291, 302 (1989); see also Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[T]he forefathers did not trust any government to
separate the true from the false for us.”). Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes cautioned against the human
inclination to silence opinions that we dislike. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[W]e should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of
opinions that we loathe . . . .”). “Persecution for the expression of opinions[,]” he wrote, is “perfectly
logical . . . [i]f you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your
heart . . . .” Id. Holmes offered against this certainty, and power’s tendency to sweep away disagreement,
a principle of epistemic doubt that is a defining hallmark of First Amendment law. See id.
150. James Weinstein, Climate Change Disinformation, Citizens Competence, and the First
Amendment, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 341, 351 (2018).
151. Indeed, public officials recently have called for a rethinking of libel laws. Alex Pappas,
Trump: ‘Our Current Libel Laws Are a Sham’, FOX NEWS (Jan. 10, 2018),
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-our-current-libel-laws-are-a-sham [https://perma.cc/AHM4UN6G]; Gregg Re, Clarence Thomas Backs Trump’s Call for Changing Defamation Law for Easing
Suits Against the Media, FOX NEWS (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/clarencethomas-calls-for-easing-defamation-suits-by-politicians-like-trump [https://perma.cc/RN42-DFCK].
Although this suggestion may seem untenable given the U.S. commitment to robust and wide-open
debate on public issues, it animates concerns about partisan enforcement.
152. Weinstein, supra note 150, at 351 (“There is even greater reason to distrust the ability of
government officials to fairly and accurately determine the speaker’s state of mind in making allegedly
false statement.”). James Weinstein explains that “government officials hostile to the speaker’s point of
view are more likely to believe that the speaker knew that the statement was false, while officials who
share the speaker’s ideological perspective will be more likely to find that any misstatement of fact was
an innocent one.” Id.
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specifically, and in democratic culture more generally.153 The “‘risk of
censorious selectivity by prosecutors’” [will] . . . distort perspectives made
available” to the public.154 It is far better to forego an outright ban of deep fakes
than to run the risk of its abuse.
Even if these normative concerns could be overcome, it is unlikely that a
flat ban on deep fakes could withstand constitutional challenge. Deep fakes
implicate freedom of expression, even though they involve intentionally false
statements.155 In the landmark 1964 decision New York Times v. Sullivan,156 the
Supreme Court held that false speech enjoys constitutional protection insofar as
its prohibition would chill truthful speech.157
In 2012, in United States v. Alvarez,158 the Court went even further. In the
plurality and concurring opinions, the Court concluded that “falsity alone” does
not remove expression from First Amendment protection.159 As Justice
Kennedy’s plurality noted, falsehoods generally warrant protection because they
inspire rebuttal and “reawaken respect” for valuable ideas in public discourse.160
Central to this point is faith in the public’s willingness to counter lies and engage
in reasoned discourse.
While all nine Justices agreed that the harmful effect of false factual
statements could be regulated, they differed in the particulars.161 The plurality
opinion took the position that false statements can be proscribed if the speakers
intended to cause “legally cognizable harm” of a kind traditionally understood
as falling outside the First Amendment’s protection.162 The concurrence posited
that a law aimed at regulating harm-causing falsehoods may be permissible if it

153. For Jack Balkin’s influential theory of free speech grounded in participation in democratic
culture, see, for example, Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, 110 NW. U.
L. REV. 1053, 1072 (2016) (arguing that key to free society is ability to engage in meaning making and
creation of culture).
154. Weinstein, supra note 150, at 360 (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 736
(2012) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
155. See generally Lewis Sargentich, Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
HARV. L. REV. 844, 845 (1970) (describing a judicial presumption against statutes that curtail a broad
array of expressive activity).
156. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
157. Id. at 264.
158. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (plurality opinion).
159. Id. at 719. For a superb discussion of the constitutional significance of lies in the aftermath
of Alvarez, see Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First
Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1435, 1440–54 (2015). See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Kenneth
Karst’s Equality as the Central Principle in the First Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 43 (2008)
(discussing a “two-level” theory of the First Amendment: one that treats high value speech with stringent
protections, and a second tier of speech that falls outside the First Amendment’s coverage).
160. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 719, 722 (“Indeed, the outrage and contempt expressed for respondent’s
lies can serve to reawaken and reinforce the public’s respect for the Medal, its recipients, and its high
purpose.”).
161. Id. at 719 (plurality opinion); id. at 731–34 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 750 (Alito, J.
dissenting).
162. Id. at 719, 725 (plurality opinion).
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does not disproportionately damage First Amendment interests.163 The dissent
would have denied First Amendment protection to false factual statements that
inflict harm and serve no legitimate purpose.164 The court reached consensus that
regulation of false statements involving history, politics, literature, and other
matters of public concern requires strict scrutiny review.165
The opinions in Alvarez, taken together, would seem to preclude a
sweeping ban on deep fakes while leaving considerable room for carefully
tailored prohibitions of certain harmful deep fakes. As the plurality underscored
in Alvarez, certain categories of speech are not covered by the First Amendment
due to their propensity to bring about serious harms and their slight contribution
to free speech values.166 Some deep fakes will fall into those categories and thus
could be subject to regulation. This includes defamation of private persons,
fraud, true threats, and the imminent-and-likely incitement of violence.167
Speech integral to criminal conduct like extortion, blackmail, and perjury has
long been understood to enjoy no First Amendment protection.168
Consider as an illustration laws banning the impersonation of government
officials (such as law enforcement officers or agency officials). As Helen Norton
insightfully explains, these statutes are “largely uncontroversial as a First
Amendment matter in great part because they address real (if often intangible)
harm to the public as well as to the individual target.”169 Lies about the source of
speech—whether a public official is actually speaking—do not serve free speech
values.170 Quite the opposite, they deny listeners the ability to assess the quality
and credibility of the speech, undermining democratic self-governance and the
search for truth.171 From a normative perspective, therefore, a surgical approach

163. Id. at 737 (Breyer, J. concurring).
164. Id. at 750 (Alito, J. dissenting).
165. Id. at 722 (Kennedy, J. plurality); id. at 734 (Breyer, J. concurring); id. at 751 (Alito, J.,
dissenting). For an insightful exploration of Alvarez and its implications for the regulation of deep fakes,
see Marc Jonathan Blitz, Lies, Line Drawing, and (Deep) Fake News, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 59, 110 (2018)
(arguing that government should have greater power to regulate forgeries than the malicious statement
of false facts); Marc Jonathan Blitz, Deep Fakes and Other Non-Testimonial Falsehoods: When Is Belief
Manipulation (Not) First Amendment Speech? (Apr. 18, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
authors) (arguing that deep fakes may fall outside of First Amendment coverage because they arguably
amount to non-testimonial evidence and change perceptions of the world around them, especially where
government seeks to require disclosure that something is a deep fake).
166. See generally CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 199–218
(discussing narrow categories of low-value speech accorded less rigorous protection or no protection
under First Amendment analysis).
167. See Chen & Marceau, supra note 159, at 1480–91.
168. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 203–05 (explaining that crimefacilitating speech does not enjoy First Amendment protection in context of cyber stalking).
169. Helen Norton, Lies to Manipulate, Misappropriate, and Acquire Government Power, in
LAW AND LIES 143, 170 (Austin Sarat ed., 2015) [hereinafter Norton, Lies to Manipulate].
170. Id. at 168. We are grateful to both Helen Norton and Marc Blitz who generously spent time
talking to us about the doctrinal and theoretical free speech issues raised in regulating deep fakes.
171. Helen Norton, (At Least) Thirteen Ways of Looking at Election Lies, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 117,
131 (2018).
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to criminal and civil liability may result in a more attractive balance of costs and
benefits than a deep-fake ban perspective. And so we turn now to a discussion
of specific possibilities, starting with civil liability.
2. Specific Categories of Civil Liability
Given that deep fakes cannot and should not be banned on a generalized
basis, the question remains whether their creators and distributors in particular
contexts should be subject to civil liability for the harms they cause. This section
reviews relevant existing laws and possible improvements.
a. Threshold Obstacles
Before reviewing the prospects for particular theories of liability, we note
two threshold problems.
The first involves attribution. Civil liability cannot ameliorate harms caused
by deep fakes if plaintiffs cannot tie them to their creators. The attribution
problem arises in the first instance because the metadata relevant for ascertaining
a deep fake’s provenance might be insufficient to identify the person who
generated it. It arises again when the creator or someone else posts a deep fake
on social media or otherwise injects it into the marketplace of information. A
careful distributor of a deep fake may take pains to be anonymous, including but
not limited to using technologies like Tor.172 When these technologies are
employed, the IP addresses connected to posts may be impossible to find and
trace back to the responsible parties.173 In such cases, a person or entity aggrieved
by a deep fake may have no practical recourse against its creator, leaving only
the possibility of seeking a remedy from the owner of platforms that enabled
circulation of the content.
A second obstacle arises when the creator of the deep fake—or the platform
circulating it—is outside the United States and thus beyond the effective reach
of US legal process, or in a jurisdiction where local legal action is unlikely to be
effective. Therefore, even if attribution is known, it still may be impossible to
use civil remedies effectively. While limitations of civil liability exist in many
settings, the global nature of online platforms makes it a particular problem in
the deep-fake context.
Moreover, regardless of whether perpetrators can be identified or reside in
the US, civil suits are expensive. Victims usually bear the heavy costs of bringing
civil claims and may be hesitant to initiate lawsuits if deep-fake generators are

172. See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 142–43 (arguing that law has
difficulty communicating norms, deterring unlawful activity, or redressing injuries if defendants have
used anonymizing technologies that make it difficult to identity them).
173. Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 46, at 117 (explaining that claims cannot be pressed
against cyber stalkers if websites hosting their abuse fails to track IP addresses).
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effectively judgment-proof.174 Worse, the “Streisand Effect” is likely to
overhang the decision to sue when the deep fake is embarrassing or
reputationally harmful. Lawsuits attract publicity; unless the victim is permitted
to sue under a pseudonym, filing a claim may exacerbate the victim’s harm.175
b. Suing the Creators of Deep Fakes
Threshold attribution and liability hurdles are not always fatal for wouldbe plaintiffs. When a victim decides to sue the creator of a deep fake, several
bodies of law come into play, including intellectual property and tort law.
First, consider copyright law. Some deep fakes exploit copyrighted content,
opening the door to monetary damages and a notice-and-takedown procedure
that can result in removal of the offending content.176 A copyright owner is the
person who took a photograph. Thus, if a deep fake involves a photo that the
victim took of herself, the victim might have a copyright claim against the creator
of the deep fake.177
The prospects for success, however, are uncertain. A court will have to
determine whether the deep fake is a “fair use” of the copyrighted material,
intended for educational, artistic, or other expressive purposes. Whether the fake
is sufficiently transformed from the original to earn fair use protection is a highly
fact-specific inquiry for which a judicial track record does not yet exist.178
Tort law also includes concepts that could be used to address deep-fake
scenarios. Most obviously, victims can sue for defamation. Where the alleged
defamation concerns private individuals rather than public figures, states may
permit plaintiffs to prevail based on a showing that the falsehood was made
negligently.179 Public officials and public figures are subject to a higher
requirement of showing clear and convincing evidence of actual malice—
knowledge or reckless disregard for the possibility that the deep fakes were

174. See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 122 (exploring limits of civil
law in redressing injuries resulting from cyber stalking).
175. Mike Masnick coined the phrase “the Streisand Effect” in Techdirt in 2005. Mike Masnick,
Since When Is It Illegal to Just Mention a Trademark Online?, TECHDIRT (Jan. 5, 2005),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20050105/0132239_F.shtml [https://perma.cc/XR42-G9BX].
176. See Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025, 2065–67 (2014) (discussing the
removal of copyright-infringing material).
177. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 122 (explaining that someone
can sue for copyright of their own image only if they took the photos themselves); see also Megan
Farokhmanesh, Is It Legal to Swap Someone’s Face Into Porn Without Consent?, VERGE (Jan. 30,
2018),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/30/16945494/deepfakes-porn-face-swap-legal
[https://perma.cc/TH4N-YUJV] (quoting Eric Goldman).
178. Compare David Greene, We Don’t Need New Laws for Faked Videos, We Already Have
Them, EFF BLOG (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/02/we-dont-need-new-lawsfaked-videos-we-already-have-them [https://perma.cc/KEG4-73L3] (noting that copyright claims may
address deep fakes subject to fair use objections) with Jesse Lempel, Combatting Deep Fakes Through
the Right of Publicity, LAWFARE (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/combatting-deepfakes-through-right-publicity [https://perma.cc/6TPH-98S9].
179. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 343–46 (1974).
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false.180 In addition to defamation, the closely related tort of placing a person in
a “false light”—or recklessly creating a harmful and false implication about
someone in a public setting—has clear potential for the deep fake context.181
Victims may also sue in tort for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
This requires proof of “extreme and outrageous conduct.”182 Creating and
circulating humiliating content like deep-fake sex videos would likely amount to
“extreme and outrageous conduct” because it falls outside the norms of decency
by most accounts.183
Another prospect is the “right of publicity” in tort law, which permits
compensation for the misappropriation of someone’s likeness for commercial
gain.184 The commercial-gain element sharply limits the utility of this model: the
harms associated with deep fakes do not typically generate direct financial gain
for their creators.185 This is likely true, for example, of deep fakes posted to harm
rivals or ex-lovers. Only in core cases, such as a business using deep-fake
technology to make it seem a particular person endorsed their product or service,
might this approach prove useful in stemming abuse. Further, the expressive
value of some deep fakes may constitute a further hurdle to liability; courts often
dismiss right of publicity claims concerning newsworthy matters on free-speech
grounds.186
Other privacy-focused torts seem relevant at first blush, yet are a poor fit
on close inspection.187 The “public disclosure of private fact” tort, for example,
allows individuals to recover for publication of private, “non-newsworthy”
information that would highly offend the reasonable person.188 While deep fakes
may meet the offense standard, using a person’s face in a deep-fake video does
not amount to the disclosure of private information if the source image was
publicly available.189 The “intrusion-on-seclusion” tort is likewise ill-suited to
180. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (AM. LAW INST. 1969); see also CITRON,
HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 121, 132–34 (explaining the reach of defamation law
in cases involving private individuals and public figures).
181. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 121, 132–34.
182. See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 133–34, 140–41 (explaining
that emotional distress claims are warranted for online abuse that is targeted, cruel, and reliant on
sensitive embarrassing information, including nude photos).
183. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Snyder v. Phelps, Outrageousness, and the Open Texture of Tort
Law, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 473 (2011).
184. See generally JENNIFER F. ROTHMAN, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A
PUBLIC WORLD (2018) (summarizing the history of the right of publicity tort).
185. See generally Lempel, supra note 178 (discussing how right to publicity claims would likely
only succeed against misappropriations intended for commercial gain).
186. See generally ROTHMAN, supra note 184.
187. See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805,
1811–14 (2010) [hereinafter Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts] (exploring the limited application of
privacy torts to twenty-first century privacy harms).
188. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 47 (4th ed.
2017).
189. See id. at 42, 49. One of us (Citron) has explored the limits of privacy torts in context of
deep-fake sex videos. Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 93, at 1933–35.
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the deep-fake scenario. It narrowly applies to defendants who “intruded into a
private place, or . . . invaded a private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown
about his person or affairs.”190 Deep-fakes usually will not involve invasions of
spaces (either physical or conceptual like email inboxes) in which individuals
have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Therefore, current options for imposing liability on creators of deep fakes
have mixed potential . Civil liability is most robust in relation to defamation,
false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, with more limited
prospects for copyright infringement and right of publicity claims.
c.

Suing the Platforms

It will be challenging to achieve individualized accountability for harmful
deep fakes, but creators are not the only parties that might bear responsibility.
Given the key role that content platforms play in enabling the distribution of deep
fakes, and the fact that creators of harmful deep fakes in some cases may be
difficult to find and deter, the most efficient and effective way to mitigate harm
may be to impose liability on platforms.191 In some contexts, this may be the only
realistic possibility for deterrence and redress.
Online platforms already have an incentive to screen content, thanks to the
impact of moral suasion, market dynamics, and political pressures.192 They do
not currently face significant civil liability risk for user-generated content,
however, for the reasons explained below.
In 1996, Congress provided platforms with a liability shield in the form of
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA). The law provided an
immunity from liability to online platforms for hosting harmful content, albeit
with an exception for content that violates federal criminal law, the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, and intellectual property law.193
Section 230 protects platforms in important ways. First, consider a situation
in which an online platform displays content that links to another source (such
as a news article or blog post) or is user-generated (such as a customer review

190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1969).
191. See Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 187, at 1839–40.
192. See Citron, Extremist Speech, supra note 46, at 1047–48; Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note
93, at 1955–58 (examining Facebook’s developing strategy to address nonconsensual pornography in
response to victims’ concerns brought to the company by advocacy groups such as the Cyber Civil
Rights Initiative); Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing
Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1616–30 (2018); see also CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN
CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 227–30 (exploring how and why content platforms moderate harmful
content); Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital
Citizenship For Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1454–59 (2011) (describing varied steps
platforms have taken to moderate digital hate, motivated by moral, business, and other instrumental
concerns). One of us (Citron) is the Vice President of the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative and has advised
social media platforms about concerns of cyber stalking victims for the past ten years, importantly
without compensation.
193. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). See generally Citron & Wittes, supra note 46.
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posted on Yelp). Now, imagine that the content is defamatory or otherwise
actionable. Can the plaintiff sue the online platform that helped it see the light of
day? Not under Section 230. Section 230(c)(1) expressly forbids treating the
platform as a “publisher” or “speaker” of someone else’s problematic content.
As courts have interpreted Section 230, online platforms enjoy immunity from
liability for user-generated content even if they deliberately encouraged the
posting of that content.194
Next, consider a situation in which an online platform decides not to allow
users to post whatever they wish, but to instead screen and block certain harmful
content. Might the act of filtering become the basis of liability? If so, platforms
might be loath to do any screening at all. Section 230(c)(2) was meant to remove
the disincentive to self-regulation that liability otherwise might produce.195
Simply put, it forbids civil suits against platforms based on the good-faith act of
filtering to screen out offensive content, whether in the nature of obscenity,
harassment, violence, or otherwise.196
In crafting Section 230, the bill’s sponsors thought they were devising a
safe harbor for online service providers that would enable the growth of the thenemerging “Internet.”197 Representative Chris Cox, for example, became
interested after reading about a trial court decision holding Prodigy, an online
services company, liable as a publisher of defamatory comments because it tried
but failed to filter profanity on its bulletin boards.198 A key goal of the legislation

194. See Citron & Wittes, supra note 46, at 408–09 (laying out judicial decisions interpreting
Section 230 that have produced sweeping immunity from liability for user-generated content, including
for sites that encourage users to post illegal content and sites that knowingly and deliberately repost
illegal content); see also CITRON & JURECIC, PLATFORM JUSTICE, supra note 46 (same). In one
example, Michael Herrick sued Grindr, a dating app, after the site refused to remove a user who was
impersonating him on the app, sharing his nude images, claiming he had rape fantasies, and providing
his home address. Herrick v. Grindr, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579, 585–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). More than 1,000
men came to Herrick’s home demanding sex. Id. at 588. Grindr refused to address Herrick’s large
number of complaints. Id. The district court dismissed the case on Section 230 grounds, which the
Second Circuit affirmed in a summary order. Id.; Herrick v. Grindr, 765 Fed. Appx. 586 (2d Cir. 2019).
195. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2); Citron & Wittes, supra note 46, at 406 (explaining that Section
230(c)(2) provides broad protections for good-faith over-screening of content).
196. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
held liable on account of . . . any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to . . . material
that the provide or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing,
or otherwise objectionable . . . .”).
197. Danielle Keats Citron, Section 230’s Challenge to Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, KNIGHT
FIRST
AMEND.
INST.
[hereinafter
Citron,
Section
230’s
Challenge],
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/section-230s-challenge-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties
[https://perma.cc/MHN7-JXZJ] (describing history of § 230 and recent developments). See generally
CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 170. For an illuminating explanation of the
cases that prompted the adoption of Section 230 and its broad interpretation, see generally JEFF
KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET (2019).
198. The firm in question happens to have been the one that is the subject of the film Wolf of Wall
Street. See Alina Selyukh, Section 230: A Key Legal Shield for Facebook, Google is About to Change,
MORNING
EDITION
(Mar.
21,
2018),
NPR
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was to help “clean up” the Internet by making it easier for willing platforms to
filter out offensive material, removing the risk that doing so would incur civil
liability by casting them in a publisher’s role.199
At the time, sponsors Senators James Exon and Slade Gorton sought to
combat online pornography and make the “Internet” safe for kids.200
Representatives Cox and Ron Wyden, another sponsor, argued that, if “this
amazing new thing—the Internet—[was] going to blossom,” companies should
not be “punished for trying to keep things clean.”201
This intent is clear in the language of Section 230(c)(2), which expressly
concerns platforms engaged in “good faith” editorial activity involving the
blocking and filtering of offensive user-posted content. The speaker and
publisher liability provision of Section 230, however, lacks this narrowing
language and has become a foundation for courts to interpret Section 230
immunity broadly.202
No doubt, Section 230’s immunity provision has been beneficial for digital
expression and democratic culture. It has provided breathing room for the
development of online services and innumerable opportunities for speech and
discourse.203 Its supporters contend that without immunity, search engines, social
networks, and microblogging services might not have emerged.204 We agree; the
fear of publisher liability would likely have inhibited the Internet’s early
growth.205
However, an overbroad reading of Section 230 has “given online platforms
a free pass to ignore illegal activities, to deliberately repost illegal material, and
to solicit unlawful activities while ensuring that abusers cannot be identified.”206
The permissive interpretation of Section 230 eliminates “incentives for better
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2018/03/21/591622450/section-230-a-key-legalshield-for-facebook-google-is-about-to-change [https://perma.cc/S9K9-GX47].
199. See Citron & Wittes, supra note 46, at 405–06.
200. See S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 59 (1995). Key provisions criminalized the transmission of
indecent material to minors.
201. Selyukh, supra note 198 (quoting Cox); see CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra
note 40, at 170–72 (describing the original purpose of Section 230’s immunity provision).
202. See Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 46, at 121–23; Citron & Wittes, supra note 46, at
408–10. In the landmark Reno v. ACLU decision, the Supreme Court struck down the CDA’s blanket
restrictions on Internet indecency under the First Amendment. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
Online expression was too important to be limited to what government officials think is fit for children.
Id. at 875. Section 230’s immunity provision, however, was left intact.
203. Citron & Wittes, supra note 46, at 413.
204. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 171. For some of the most
insightful work on the significance of Section 230’s immunity provision, see the work of Daphne Keller,
Jeff Kosseff, and Mike Godwin. See, e.g., MIKE GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTS: DEFENDING FREE SPEECH
IN THE DIGITAL AGE 319–54 (2003); KOSSEFF, supra note 197; Daphne Keller, Toward a Clearer
KNIGHT
FIRST
AMEND.
INST.,
Conversation
about
Platform
Liability,
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/toward-clearer-conversation-about-platform-liability
[https://perma.cc/YSS5-WHJG].
205. Id.
206. Citron & Wittes, supra note 46, at 413.
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behavior by those in the best position to minimize harm.”207 The results have
been two-fold. On one hand, the law has created an open environment for hosting
and distributing user-generated online content. On the other, it has generated an
environment in which it is exceptionally hard to hold providers accountable,
even in egregious circumstances involving systematic disinformation and
falsehoods.208
Courts have extended the immunity provision to a remarkable array of
scenarios. They include instances where a provider republished content knowing
it violated the law;209 solicited illegal content while ensuring that those
responsible could not be identified;210 altered its user interface to ensure that
criminals could were not caught;211 and sold dangerous products.212 In this way,
Section 230 has evolved into a super-immunity that, among other things,
prevents the best-positioned entities to respond to most harmful content. This
would have seemed absurd to the CDA’s drafters.213 The law’s overbroad
interpretation means that platforms have no liability-based reason to take down
illicit material, and that victims have no legal leverage to insist otherwise.214
Rebecca Tushnet aptly expressed it a decade ago: Section 230 ensures that
platforms enjoy “power without responsibility.”215
Unfortunately, platforms’ power now includes the ability to ignore the
propagation of damaging deep fakes. To be sure, some platforms do not need
civil liability exposure to take action against deep-fake generated harms; market
pressures and morals are enough. In most cases, however, these forces are
insufficient to spur response.
Should Section 230 be amended to extend liability to a wider-range of
circumstances? In 2018, lawmakers modified the statute by enacting the Allow
States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (“FOSTA”) to address
websites’ facilitation of sex trafficking.216 FOSTA added a new exception to
207. Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 46, at 118.
208. See Tim Hwang, Dealing with Disinformation: Evaluating the Case for CDA 230
Amendment
(Dec.
17,
2017)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3089442 [https://perma.cc/MD3Q-MR92].
209. Phan v. Pham, 182 Cal. App. 4th 323 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); Shiamili v. Real Est. Grp. of
N.Y., 17 N.Y.3d 281 (N.Y. 2011).
210. Jones v. Dirty World Enter. Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014); S.C. v. Dirty
World, LLC, No. 11–CV–00392–DW, 2012 WL 3335284 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 2012).
211. Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016).
212. Hinton v. Amazon,com.dedc, LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 685, 687 (S.D. Miss. 2014).
213. Cox recently said as much: “I’m afraid . . . the judge-made law has drifted away from the
original purpose of the statute.” Selyukh, supra note 198. In his view, sites that solicit unlawful materials
or have a connection to unlawful activity should not enjoy Section 230 immunity. See id.
214. See Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 46, at 118; Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing
Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101 (2007); Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner,
Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 221 (2006).
215. Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First Amendment,
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986 (2008).
216. See Danielle Citron & Quinta Jurecic, FOSTA: The New Anti-Sex-Trafficking Legislation
May Not End the Internet, But It’s Not a Good Law Either, LAWFARE (Mar. 28, 2018),
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Section 230 immunity, similar to the provision preserving the ability to sue for
intellectual property claims. Now, plaintiffs, including state attorneys general,
acting on behalf of victims, may avoid Section 230 immunity when suing
platforms for knowingly assisting, supporting, or facilitating sex trafficking
offenses.
FOSTA did not become law without controversy. Some decried the erosion
of Section 230 over concerns that greater liability exposure for online platforms
would result in a decrease in outlets, and more self-censorship by those
remaining.217 Others criticized FOSTA’s language as indeterminate, potentially
resulting in less filtering rather than more.218 On the other hand, the FOSTA
debate also raises the question whether Congress instead erred by not going far
enough in carving out exceptions to Section 230 immunity.
Section 230 should be amended to allow a limited degree of platform
liability relating to deep fakes. 219 Building on prior work in which one of us
(Citron) proposed a similar change in an article co-authored with Benjamin
Wittes, we propose that Section 230(c)(1) protections to platforms be conditional
rather than automatic.220 To qualify, an entity must demonstrate that it has taken
“reasonable steps” to ensure that its platform is not being used for illegal ends.
Platforms that meet this relatively-undemanding requirement will continue to
enjoy the protections of Section 230, but others will not and hence may be treated
as a publisher of user-generated content that they host.221
To be sure, such an amendment would raise hard questions regarding the
metes and bounds of reasonableness. The scope of the duty would need to track
salient differences among online entities. For example, “ISPs and social
networks with millions of postings a day cannot plausibly respond to complaints
of abuse immediately, let alone within a day or two,”222 yet “they may be able to
deploy technologies to detect content previously deemed unlawful.”223
Inevitably, the “duty of care will evolve as technology improves.”224
This proposed amendment would be useful as a means to incentivize
platforms to take reasonable steps to minimize the most-serious harms that might
follow from user-posted or user-distributed deep fakes. If the reasonably

https://www.lawfareblog.com/fosta-new-anti-sex-trafficking-legislation-may-not-end-Internet-its-notgood-law-either [https://perma.cc/2W8X-2KE9] [hereinafter Cintron & Jurecic, FOSTA].
217. See CITRON & JURECIC, PLATFORM JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 7 (cataloguing the arguments
against FOSTA, including the fact that FOSTA raises the moderator’s dilemma that animated the
adoption of Section 230 and the risk—borne out—that sites will over-filter content related to sex in any
way).
218. See, e.g., Citron & Jurecic, FOSTA, supra note 216 (arguing that FOSTA is both too narrow
and too broad).
219. Citron & Wittes, supra note 46, at 419.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Citron, Section 230’s Challenge, 197.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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available technical and other means for detection and removal of harmful fakes
are limited, so too will be the obligation on the part of the platform.225 But as
those means improve, so would the incentive to use them.226
We recognize that this proposal runs risks, beyond the usual challenges
associated with common law development of a novel standard of care. For
example, opening the door to liability may over-deter platforms that are
uncertain about the standard of care (and fearful of runaway juries imposing
massive damages). This might drive sites to shutter (or to never emerge), and it
might cause undue private censorship at the sites that remain. Free expression,
innovation, and commerce all would suffer, on this view.
To ameliorate these concerns, this proposal can be cabined along several
dimensions. First, the amendment to Section 230 could include a sunset
provision paired with data-gathering requirements that would empower
Congress to make an informed decision on renewal.227 Data-gathering should
include the type and frequency of content removed by platforms as well as the
extent to which platforms use automation to filter or block certain types of
content. This would permit Congress to assess whether the law was resulting in
overbroad private censorship, and acting as a Heckler’s veto. Second, the
amendment could include carefully tailored damages caps. Third, the
amendment could be paired with a federal anti-SLAAP provision, which would
deter frivolous lawsuits designed to silence protected speech. Last, the
amendment could include an exhaustion-of-remedies provision pursuant to
which plaintiffs, as a precondition to suit, must first provide notice to the
platform regarding the allegedly improper content. The platform would have a
specified window of time to examine and respond to the objection.
In sum, a reasonably calibrated standard of care combined with safeguards
could reduce opportunities for abuses without interfering unduly with the further
development of a vibrant Internet. It would also avoid unintentionally turning
innocent platforms into involuntary insurers for those injured through their sites.
Approaching the problem with the goal of setting an appropriate standard more
readily allows differentiation between kinds of online actors, and a separate rule
for websites designed to facilitate illegality in contrast to large ISPs linking
millions to the Internet. That said, features used to control the scope of platform

225. What comes to mind is Facebook’s effort to use hashing technology to detect and remove
nonconsensual pornography that has been banned as terms-of-service violations. Citron, Sexual Privacy,
supra note 93, at 1955–58. One of us (Citron) serves on a small task force advising Facebook about the
use of screening tools to address the problem of nonconsensually posted intimate images.
226. Current screening technology is far more effective against some kinds of abusive material
than others; progress may produce cost-effective means of defeating other attacks. With current
technologies, it is difficult, if not impossible, to automate the detection of certain illegal activity. That is
certainly true of deep fakes in this current technological environment.
227. We see an example of that approach at several points in the history of the “Section 702”
surveillance program. Caroline Lynch, The Virtue of Sunsets?, LAWFARE (Feb. 28, 2017),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/virtue-sunsets [https://perma.cc/5FNL-495P].
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liability are only a partial solution to the deep-fakes challenge. Other policy
responses will be necessary.
3. Specific Categories of Criminal Liability
Civil liability is not the only means through which the legal system can
discourage the creation and distribution of harmful deep fakes. Criminal liability
is another possibility. Can it close some of the gaps identified above?
Only to a limited extent. The criminal liability model in theory does have
the capacity to overcome some of the most significant limits on the civil liability
model. Being judgment proof might spare someone from fear of civil suit, for
example, but it is no protection from being sent to prison and bearing the other
consequences of criminal conviction.228 And whereas the identification and
service of process on the creator or distributor of a harmful deep fake often will
be beyond the practical reach of would-be private plaintiffs, law enforcement
entities have greater investigative capacities (in addition to the ability to seek
extradition). It is far from clear, though, that these notional advantages can be
brought to bear effectively in practice.
To some extent, the capacity of criminal law is a question of setting law
enforcement priorities and allocating resources accordingly. So far, law
enforcement’s track record is not promising. Notwithstanding notable
exceptions, law enforcement, on the whole, has had a lackluster response to
online abuse. In particular, state and local law enforcement agencies often fail to
pursue cyberstalking complaints adequately because they lack training in the
relevant laws and in the investigative techniques necessary to track down online
abusers (federal prosecutors—including especially DOJ’s Computer Crimes and
Intellectual Property Section—have a much stronger record, but their capabilities
do not scale easily).229 Although a wide range of deep fakes might warrant
criminal charges, only the most extreme cases are likely to attract the attention
of law enforcement.
Apart from questions of investigative and prosecutorial will, the prospects
for criminal liability also depend on the scope of criminal laws themselves. To
what extent do existing laws actually cover deep fakes, and to what extent might
new ones do so?
A number of current criminal statutes—concerning cyber stalking,
impersonation, and defamation—are potentially relevant. Posting deep fakes in
connection with the targeting of individuals, for example, might violate the
federal cyberstalking laws, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, or analogous state statutes. Under
federal law, it is a felony to use any “interactive computer service or electronic
228. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 123.
229. Id. at 144. Assistant US Attorney Mona Sedky is a shining example. See The Lawfare
Podcast: Mona Sedky on Prosecuting Sextortion, LAWFARE (June 25, 2016),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-mona-sedky-prosecutingsextortion
[http://perma.cc/262G-KSLV].
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communication service” to “intimidate”230 a person in ways “reasonably
expected to cause substantial emotional distress . . . .”231 This reflects the fact
that, even when cyberstalking victims do not fear bodily harm, “their lives are
totally disrupted . . . in the most insidious and frightening ways.”232 Defendants
can be punished for up to five years in prison and fined up to $250,000, with
additional sentencing requirements for repeat offenders and for defendants
whose offense violates a restraining order.233 Some deep fakes will fit this bill.
Impersonation crimes may be applicable as well. Several states make it a
crime, for example, to knowingly and credibly impersonate another person
online with intent to “harm[], intimidat[e], threaten[], or defraud[]” that
person.234 And while the “harm, intimidate, threaten” portion of such statutes to
some extent tracks the cyberstalking statute described above, its extension to
“fraud” opens the door to a wider, though uncertain, range of potential
applications. In certain jurisdictions, creators of deep fakes could also face
charges for criminal defamation if they posted videos knowing that they were
fake or if they were reckless as to their truth or falsity.235 Similarly, using
someone’s face in a violent deep-fake sex video might support charges for both
impersonation and defamation if the defendant intended to terrorize or harm the
person and knew the video was fake.
230. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) (2012).
231. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1)(B). The federal cyberstalking statute has state analogues in a
significant number of states, though some state cyberstalking statutes are limited to online abuse sent
directly to victims. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 124.
232. Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act: Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Congress 28 (2005) (statement of Mary Lou Leary, Executive Director of the National Center for
Victims of Crime).
233. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2).
234. CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5 (West 2009); see also HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 711-1106.6
(2019); LA. REV. STAT. § 14:73.10 (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-33 (2019); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 190.25 (2019); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-7.1 (2019); TEX. PENAL CODE § 33.07 (2019). The Texas
impersonation statute withstood facial challenge in Ex parte Bradshaw, 501 S.W.3d 665, 674 (Tex. App.
2016) (explaining that the conduct regulated by the statute is “the act of assuming another person’s
identity, without that person’s consent, and with intent to harm, defraud, intimidate, or threaten . . . by
creating a webpage or posting . . .”). Arizona tried to pass a similar law, but the bill failed in the
legislature. See H.B. 2489, 53 Leg., 1st Sess. (Ariz. 2017). It is a federal crime to impersonate a federal
official, though its application may be limited to circumstances in which the defendant intends to defraud
others of something of value. 18 U.S.C. § 912 (“Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer
or employee acting under the authority of the United States or any department agency or officer thereof,
and acts as such . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned.”). Compare United States v. Gayle, 967
F.2d 483 (11th Cir. 1992) (establishing that an indictment under Sec. 912 did not need to allege an intent
to defraud, because such intent could be gathered from the alleged facts), with United States v. Pollard,
486 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1973) (establishing that failure to allege the intent to defraud is a fatal defect in
an indictment under Sec. 912). See also United States v. Jones, 16-cr-0553 (AJN), 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 31703 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 2, 2018) (explaining that indictment under § 912 does not include the
element to defraud as part of the offense). The 1948 changes to § 912 specifically dropped the words
“intent to defraud,” yet the Fifth Circuit is the only circuit that still reads the statute to include as an
element the intent to defraud.
235. See Eugene Volokh, One-to-One Speech Vs. One-to-Many Speech, Criminal Harassment
Laws, and “Cyberstalking”, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 731 (2013).
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The foregoing examples concern harm to specific individuals, but some
harms flowing from deep fakes will be distributed broadly across society. A
pernicious example of the latter is a deep fake calculated to spur an audience to
violence. Some platforms ban content calling for violence, but not all do.236
Could the creator of such a deep fake be prosecuted under a statute like 18 U.S.C.
§ 2101, which criminalizes the use of facilities of interstate commerce, such as
the Internet, with intent to incite a riot? Incitement charges must comport with
the First Amendment constraints identified in Brandenburg, including that the
speech in question be likely to produce imminent lawless action.237 This leaves
many deep fakes beyond the law’s reach even though they may have played a
role in violence.
Can criminal law be helpful in limiting harms from deep fakes in the
particularly sensitive context of elections? Although lies have long plagued the
democratic process, deep fakes present a troubling development. Some states
have criminalized the intentional use of lies to impact elections.238 These
experiments have run into constitutional hurdles, however.
Free speech scholar Helen Norton explains that while political candidates’
lies “pose . . . harms to their listeners . . . and may also . . . undermine public
confidence in the integrity of the political process,” laws forbidding such lies
“threaten significant First Amendment harms because they regulate expression
in a context in which we especially fear government overreaching and partisan
abuse.”239 As the Court underscored in Brown v. Hartlage,240 the “State’s fear
that voters might make an ill-advised choice does not provide the State with a
compelling justification for limiting speech.”241 Not surprisingly, courts
therefore have struck down periodic attempts to ban election-related lies.242 The
entry of deep fakes into the mix may not change that result. As explored above,
236. YouTube, for example, barred incitement in 2008. See Peter Whoriskey, YouTube Bans
Videos That Incite Violence, WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/09/11/AR2008091103447.html [https://perma.cc/YVR5-JGXV].
237. Multiple states prescribe criminal penalties for those who engage in similar conduct. See,
e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 404.6 (2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 870.01 (2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8105 (2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-408 (2019). For an excellent overview of crimes of incitement in
the digital age and the associated issues, see Margot E. Kaminski, Incitement to Riot in the Age of Flash
Mobs, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (2012).
238. See Nat Stern, Judicial Candidates’ Right to Lie, 77 MD. L. REV. 774 (2018).
239. Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections?, 74 MONT. L.
REV. 53, 69 (2013) (“[T]o survive constitutional review, any false campaign speech law would have to
be narrow, targeted only at false speech made with actual malice . . . .”); Helen Norton, Lies and the
Constitution, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 199 (2012).
240. 456 U.S. 45, 46 (1982).
241. Id. at 60.
242. See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2016) (striking down
an Ohio election-lies law as a content-based restriction of “core political speech” that lacked sufficient
tailoring); 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 785 (8th Cir. 2014) (“[N]o amount of narrow
tailoring succeeds because [Minnesota’s political false-statements law] is not necessary, is
simultaneously overbroad and underinclusive, and is not the least restrictive means of achieving any
stated goal.”).
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however, criminal laws banning the impersonation of government officials or
candidates for office may overcome constitutional challenge.243
Ultimately, criminal liability is not likely to be a particularly effective tool
against deep fakes that pertain to elections. The most capable actors with motive
and means to deploy deep fakes in a high-impact manner in an election setting
will include the intelligence services of foreign governments engaging in such
activity as a form of covert action, as we saw with Russia in relation to the
American election of 2016. The prospect of a criminal prosecution in the United
States will mean little to foreign government agents involved in such activity so
long as they are not likely to end up in US custody (though it might mean
something more to private actors through whom those agencies sometimes
choose to act, at least if they intend to travel abroad).244
C. Administrative Agency Solutions
The foregoing analysis suggests that prosecutors and private plaintiffs can
and likely will play an important role in curbing harms from deep fakes, but also
that this role has significant limitations. We therefore turn to consider the
potential contributions of other actors, starting with administrative agencies.
Generally speaking, agencies can advance public policy goals through
rulemaking, adjudication, or both.245 Agencies do not enjoy plenary jurisdiction
to use these tools in relation to any subject they wish. Typically, their field of
operation is defined—with varying degrees of specificity—by statute. And thus
we might begin by asking which agencies have the most plausible grounds for
addressing deep fakes.
At the federal level, three candidates stand out: the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”), the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), and
the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”). On close inspection, however, their
potential roles appear quite limited.
1. The FTC
Consider the Federal Trade Commission and its charge to regulate and
litigate in an effort to minimize deceptive or unfair commercial acts and
practices.246 For that matter, consider the full range of state actors (often a state’s
243. See supra notes 170172 and accompanying text. For a thoughtful exploration of why deep
fakes created and used in election context should be understood as proscribable fraud, see Green, supra
note 108.
244. On the use of private actors by state agencies in the context of hacking, see TIM MAURER,
CYBER MERCENARIES: THE STATE, HACKERS, AND POWER (2018). For an example of successful
prosecution of such private actors, see United States v. Baratov, No. 3:17-CR-103 VC, 2018 WL
1978898 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2018) (five-year sentence for Canadian national who acted as a contractor
involved in a hacking campaign directed by Russia’s FSB against companies including Yahoo!).
245. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1278
(2008).
246. 5 U.S.C.§ 45(b) (2012).
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Attorney General’s Office) that play a similar role. Bearing that charge in mind,
can these entities intervene in the deep fake context?
A review of current areas of FTC activity suggests limited possibilities.
Most deep fakes will not take the form of advertising, but some will. That subset
will implicate the FTC’s role in protecting consumers from fraudulent
advertising relating to “food, drugs, devices, services, or cosmetics.”247 Some
deep fakes will be in the nature of satire or parody, without intent or even effect
of misleading consumers into believing a particular person (a celebrity or some
other public figure) is endorsing the product or service in question. That line will
be crossed in some instances, however. If such a case involves a public figure
who is aware of the fraud and both inclined to and capable of suing on their own
behalf for misappropriation of likeness, there is no need for the FTC or a state
agency to become involved. Those conditions will not always be met, though,
especially when the deep-fake element involves a fraudulent depiction of
something other than a specific person’s words or deeds; there would be no
obvious private plaintiff. The FTC and state attorneys general (state AGs) can
play an important role in that setting.
Beyond deceptive advertising, the FTC has authority to investigate unfair
and deceptive commercial acts and practices under Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.248 Much like Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, state UDAP laws (enforced by state AGs) prohibit deceptive commercial
acts and practices and unfair trade acts and practices whose costs exceed their
benefits.249 UDAP laws empower attorneys general to seek civil penalties,
injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs.250
Acting in that capacity, for example, the FTC previously investigated and
reached a settlement with Facebook regarding its treatment of user data—and is
now doing so again in the aftermath of public furor over the Cambridge
Analytica debacle.251 In response to the problem of fake news in general and
deep-fake news in particular, the FTC might contemplate asserting a role under
247. 5 U.S.C. § 52(a)(1)–(2).
248. See 15 U.S.C. § 45. For the crucial role that the FTC has played in the development of
privacy policy, see CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND
POLICY (2016); Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data
Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230 (2015); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and
the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014).
249. See generally Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General,
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 755–57 (2016).
250. See, e.g., California Unfair Business Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17206 (West 2016)
(imposing $ 2,500 per violation); Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/7 (West
2016) (allowing civil penalty of $50,000 per unlawful act); see also Steven J. Cole, State Enforcement
Efforts Directed Against Unfair or Deceptive Practices, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 125, 128 (1987) (explaining
that in states like Maryland the “consumer protection authority resides wholly within the Attorney
General’s Office”).
251. Louise Matsakis, The FTC is Officially Investigating Facebook’s Data Practices, WIRED
(Mar.
26,
2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/ftc-facebook-data-privacy-investigation
[https://perma.cc/GJX8-LQ27].
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the rubric of “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”252
Any such efforts would face several obstacles, however. First, Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act as currently written would shield platforms at
least to some extent from liability for publishing users’ deep fakes. Second, it is
not clear this would be a proper interpretation of the FTC’s jurisdiction.
Professor David Vladeck, formerly head of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer
Protection, has expressed doubt about the FTC’s jurisdiction to regulate sites
purveying fake news.253 Vladeck argues, “[f]ake news stories that get circulated
or planted or tweeted around are not trying to induce someone to purchase a
product; they’re trying to induce someone to believe an idea.”254 Finally, the
prospect of a government entity attempting to distinguish real news from fake
news—and suppressing the latter—raises the First Amendment concerns
described above in relation to election-lies laws.
Might a different agency at least have a stronger jurisdictional claim to
become involved in some settings? This brings us to the Federal
Communications Commission.
2. The FCC
If any regulatory agency is to play a role policing against harms from deep
fakes circulating online, the FCC at first blush might seem a natural fit. It has a
long tradition of regulating the communications of broadcasters, and many have
observed that the major social media platforms of the twenty-first century occupy
a place in our information ecosystem similar to the central role that radio and
television broadcasters enjoyed in the twentieth century.255 Similar thinking led
the FCC in 2015 to break new ground by reclassifying Internet service providers
as a “telecommunications service” rather than an “information service,” thus
opening the door to more extensive regulation.256 Amidst intense controversy,
however, the FCC in late 2017 reversed course on this position on ISPs,257 and
in any event never asserted that so-called “edge providers” like Facebook also
should be brought under the “telecommunications service” umbrella.258

252. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012); see Callum Borchers, How
the Federal Trade Commission Could (Maybe) Crack Down on Fake News, WASH. POST (Jan. 30,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/30/how-the-federal-tradecommission-could-maybe-crack-down-on-fake-news/?utm_term=.4ef8ece1baec
[https://perma.cc/L2XD-T445].
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES
(2010).
256. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,737 (F.C.C. Apr. 13, 2015)
(declaratory ruling).
257. Restoring Internet Freedom, FCC 17-166 (2018).
258. Consumer Watchdog Petition for Rulemaking to Require Edge Providers to Honor ‘Do Not
Track’ Requests, DA 15-1266 (2015).
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As things stand, the FCC appears to lack jurisdiction (not to mention
interest) over content circulated via social media. However, concern over fake
news, incitement, radicalization, or any number of other hot-button issues might
at some point tip the scales either for the FCC to reinterpret its own authority or
for Congress to intervene. For the moment, however, this pathway appears
closed, leaving the FCC’s role in relation to deep fakes limited to potential efforts
to deter their appearance on radio or television.
3. The FEC
A third federal agency with a plausible stake in the topic of deep fakes is
the Federal Election Commission. Plainly, its jurisdiction would touch upon deep
fakes only as they relate to elections—a narrow, but important, subfield. Whether
and how the FEC might act in relation to deep fakes even in that setting, however,
is unclear.
The FEC regulates campaign speech, but not in ways that would speak
directly to the deep-fake scenario. In particular, the FEC does not purport to
regulate the truth of campaign-related statements, nor is it likely to assert or
receive such jurisdiction anytime soon for all the reasons discussed above in
relation to the First Amendment obstacles, practical difficulty, and political
sensitivity of such an enterprise. Instead, its central focus is financing, and the
main thrust of its regulatory efforts relating to speech is to increase transparency
regarding sponsorship and funding for political advertising.259
There might be room for a regulatory approach that requires deep fake
creators to disclose the fact that the video or audio is a fake.260 The Court has
upheld campaign speech regulations requiring truthful disclosure of the source
of the communication.261 And for good reason—listeners depend upon the source
of speech to make decisions at the ballot box.262
Such an approach could have at least some positive impact on deep fakes
in the electoral setting. For outlets within the FEC’s jurisdiction, transparency
obligations create elements of attribution and accountability for content creators
that might, to some extent, deter resort to deep fakes in advertising. But note that
major online social media platforms are not, currently, subject to FEC
jurisdiction in this context: Facebook, Google, and other online advertising
platforms have long-resisted imposition of the FEC’s disclosure rules, often

259. For an interesting proposal for new regulations that the FEC might fruitfully pursue in this
vein with respect to the general problem of misleading campaign advertising, see Abby K. Wood & Ann
M. Ravel, Fool Me Once: Regulating “Fake News” and Other Online Advertising, 91 S. CAL. L. REV.
1223 (2018).
260. Blitz, Deep Fakes and Other Non-Testimonial Falsehoods, supra note 165.
261. Norton, Lies to Manipulate, supra note 169, at 165–67.
262. Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through
Heuristic Cues and ‘Disclosure Plus,’ 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1158–59 (2003); Helen Norton, Secrets,
Lies, and Disclosure, 27 J.L. & POL. 641, 644 (2012).
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citing the practical difficulties that would follow for small screens displaying
even smaller ads.
In the wake of the 2016 election, the FEC faces pressure to extend its reach
to these platforms nonetheless, so that caveat might drop out at some point.263
Even so, this certainly would not resolve the threat to elections posed by deep
fakes.
FEC regulation surely would not eliminate deep fakes’ threat to elections.
Some amount of fraudulent posting no doubt would continue simply because
enforcement systems will not be perfect, and also because not all content about
someone who is a candidate will be framed in ways that would appear to count
as advertising. Deep fakes in particular are likely to take the form of just raw
video or audio of some event that occurred, by no means necessarily embedded
within any larger narrative or framing content. The FEC’s disclosure rules in any
event are candidate specific, and do not encompass generalized “issue ads” that
express views on a topic but do not single out particular candidates.
D. Coercive Responses
The utility of civil suits, criminal prosecution, and regulatory actions will
be limited when the source of the fake is a foreign entity that may lie beyond the
reach of American judicial process (though it is not non-existent, as we have seen
from time to time in the context of cybersecurity).264 Nevertheless, it is important
to recall that the Government possesses other instruments that it can bring to bear
in such contexts in order to impose significant costs on the perpetrators. We
provide a brief discussion of three such scenarios here.
1. Military Responses
There is no doubt that deep fakes will play a role in future armed conflicts.
Information operations of various kinds have long been an important aspect of
warfare, as the contending parties attempt to influence the beliefs, will, and
passions of a wide range of audiences (opposing forces and their commanders,

263. Google in 2006 obtained an exemption from disclosure obligations based on the practical
argument that its online ad spaces were too small to accommodate the words. In the spring of 2018 the
FEC began the process of changing this approach. See Alex Thompson, The FEC Took a Tiny Step to
Regulate Online Political Ads, But Not in Time for 2018 Elections, VICE NEWS (Mar. 15, 2018),
https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/neq88q/the-fec-took-a-tiny-step-to-regulate-online-political-adsbut-not-in-time-for-2018-elections [https://perma.cc/E7QB-NXAW].
264. For example, foreign nationals at times have been extradited to the United States to face
criminal charges relating to hacking. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District
of New York, “Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Extradition Of Alleged Russian Hacker
Responsible For Massive Network Intrusions At U.S. Financial Institutions, Brokerage Firms, A Major
News Publication, And Other Companies” (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usaosdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-extradition-alleged-russian-hacker-responsible-massive
[https://perma.cc/2A36-LXDD].
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opposing politicians and electorates, local populations, allies, and so forth).265
Such effects are sought at every level from the tactical to the strategic, and with
an eye towards effects ranging from the immediate to the long-term.
Deep-fake capacity will be useful in all such settings. Insurgents, for
example, might inflame local opinion against US or allied forces by depicting
those forces burning a Quran or killing a civilian. If deployed deftly enough,
such fraud might also be used to advance a “lawfare” strategy, leveraging the
good intentions of journalists and NGOs to generate distracting or even
debilitating legal, political, and diplomatic friction. Insurgents also might deploy
the technology to make their own leaders or personnel appear more admirable or
brave than otherwise might be possible, to create the false impression that they
were in a particular location at a particular time, or even to make it seem that a
particular leader is still alive and free rather than dead or captured. The US
military, for its part, might use deep fakes to undermine the credibility of an
insurgent leader by making it appear that the person is secretly cooperating with
the United States or engaging in immoral or otherwise hypocritical behavior. If
the technology is robust enough, and deployed deftly enough, the opportunities
for mischief—deadly mischief, in some cases—will be plentiful on both sides.
If and when adversaries of the United States do use deep fakes in
connection with an armed conflict, the options for a military response would be
no different than would be the case for any form of enemy information operation.
This might entail penetration of the adversary’s computer networks, for purposes
of both intelligence gathering, making it easier to prepare for or respond to a
deep fake, and disruption operations, degrading or destroying the adversary’s
capacity to produce them in the first place. It might entail a kinetic strike on
facilities or individuals involved in the deep fake production process, subject of
course to the law of armed conflict rules governing distinction, proportionality,
and so forth.266 And it might entail the capture and detention of enemy personnel
or supporters involved in such work.
265. The US military defines “information operations,” as the use of any and all informationrelated capabilities during the course of military operations in order “to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or
usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting our own.” CHAIRMAN OF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13: PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS VI-5 (2010).
Separately, it defines “psychological operations” as “planned operations to convey selected information
and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and
ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals” in a manner
“favorable to the originator’s objectives.” Id. at GL-8. Until 2010, these activities were known as
psychological operations, or psyops. In 2017, the Army re-adopted the psyops name. See MISO Name
Change—Back to Psychological Operations (PSYOP), SOF NEWS (Nov. 8, 2017),
http://www.sof.news/io/miso-name-change [https://perma.cc/79VX-XN8B].
266. The possibility of targeting a person based solely on involvement in production of a deepfake video supporting the enemy—as opposed to targeting them based on status as a combatant—would
raise serious issues under the principle of distinction. Assuming, again, that the prospective target is best
categorized as a civilian, he or she would be targetable only while directly participating in hostilities.
Debates abound regarding the scope of direct participation, but most scenarios involving creation of
media would appear to be indirect in nature. One can imagine a special case involving especially
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The situation becomes more complicated insofar as the individuals or
servers involved in creating deep fakes relating to an armed conflict are not
actually located in theater. If either reside in third countries, the freedom of
action for a military response of any kind may be sharply circumscribed both by
policy and by legal considerations. This is a familiar challenge for the military
in relation to non-deep-fake online propaganda activity conducted by and for the
Islamic State using servers outside the Syria/Iraq theater, and the manner in
which it would play out would be no different (for better or worse) if one
introduces deep-fake technology to the mix.
2. Covert Action
Covert action might be used as a response to a foreign government’s use of
deep fakes. “Covert action” refers to government-sponsored activity that is
meant to impact events overseas without the US government’s role being
apparent or acknowledged.267 That is a capacious definition, encompassing a
wide-range of potential activities. Propaganda and other information operations,
for example, can be and frequently are conducted as covert actions. And certainly
we can expect to see the intelligence services of many countries making use of
deep-fake technologies in that context in the future (the Russian covert action
campaign that targeted the American election in 2016 was significant even
without the aid of deep fakes, but one can certainly expect to see deep fakes used
in such settings in the future). The point of mentioning covert action here is not
to repeat the claim that states will use deep fakes on an unacknowledged basis in
the future. Instead, the point is to underscore that the US government has the
option of turning to covert action in response to a foreign government’s use of
deep fakes.
What, in particular, might this entail? First, it could be the basis for
degrading or destroying the technical capacity of a foreign actor to produce deep
fakes (for example, through a computer network operation designed to make
subtle changes to a GAN). The military options described above also included
such technical means, but covert action offers advantages over the military
alternative. Most notably, covert action does not require any predicate
circumstance of armed conflict; presidents may resort to it when they wish.
Moreover, because covert action is not publicly acknowledged, the diplomatic
and political friction that might otherwise make a particular action unattractive
is reduced in comparison to overt alternatives (although not necessarily
eliminated, for the activity may later become public). Further, covert action may
be a particularly attractive option where the activity in question might violate
international law. The statutory framework governing covert action requires
inflammatory deep fakes designed to cause an immediate violent response, though even there hard
questions would arise about the likely gap in time between creation of such a video and its actual
deployment.
267. See 50 U.S.C. § 3093(e) (2012).
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compliance with the Constitution and statutes of the United States, but it is
conspicuously silent about compliance with international law. Many have
speculated that this is construed within the government as domestic-law
justification for activities that violate international law.268
Covert action can take any number of other forms. Rather than directly
disrupting a foreign target’s capacity to produce deep fakes, for example, covert
means might be used in a wide variety of ways to impose costs on the person,
organization, or government at issue. Covert action, in other words, can be used
to deter or punish foreign actors that employ deep fakes in ways harmful to the
United States.269
Covert-action tools are not the only options the US government has with
respect to imposing costs on foreign individuals or entities who may make
harmful use of deep fakes. We turn now to a brief discussion of a leading
example of an overt tool that can serve this same purpose quite effectively.
3. Sanctions
The economic might the United States developed over the past half-century
has given the US Government considerable leverage over foreign governments,
entities, and individuals. Congress, in turn, has empowered the executive branch
to move quickly and largely at the president’s discretion when it wishes to exploit
that leverage to advance certain interests. Most notably for present purposes, the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) establishes a
framework for the executive branch to issue economic sanctions backed by
criminal penalties.270
In order to bring this power to bear, IEEPA requires that the president first
issue a public proclamation of a “national emergency” relating to an “unusual
and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside
the United States.”271 In order to deploy IEEPA sanctions as an overt response
to foreign use of deep fakes, therefore, there needs to be either a relevant existing
national-emergency proclamation or else plausible grounds for issuing a new one
towards that end.
There is no current national-emergency proclamation that would apply
generally to the problem of deep fakes. There are more than two-dozen currently
active states of national emergency, as of the summer of 2018.272 Most have little
268. See Robert M. Chesney, Computer Network Operations and U.S. Domestic Law: An
Overview, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 218, 230–32 (2013).
269. Covert action cannot have this deterrent effect, however, if the targeted person or entity is
unaware that the United States imposed those costs, and that it did so for a particular reason. This is a
tricky (but by no means insurmountable) obstacle where the sponsoring role of the United States is not
meant to be acknowledged publicly.
270. See 50 U.S.C. ch. 35.
271. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a).
272. See Ryan Struyk, Here are the 28 Active National Emergencies. Trump Won’t Be Adding
POL.
(Aug.
15,
2017),
the
Opioid
Crisis
to
the
List,
CNN
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possible relevance, but some relate broadly to particular threat actors or regions,
and a deep-fake scenario conceivably might arise in ways that both implicate
those actors or regions and involve actors not already subject to sanctions.
A particularly important question under this heading is whether any of these
existing authorities would apply to a foreign entity employing deep fakes to
impact American elections. The answer appears to be yes, though the matter is
complicated.
In April 2015, President Obama’s Executive Order 13964 proclaimed a
national emergency with respect to “malicious cyber-enabled activities
originating from, or directed by persons located . . . outside the United States.”273
Then, in the aftermath of the 2016 election, Obama amended the order,
expanding the prohibition to forbid foreign entities from using cyber-enabled
means to “tamper[] with, alter[], or caus[e] a misappropriation of information
with the purpose or effect of interfering with or undermining election processes
or institutions . . . .”274 This was designed to allow for IEEPA sanctions against
Russian entities that interfered in the 2016 election through means that included
the DNC hack.
President Obama immediately used the authority to sanction Russia’s FSB,
GRU, and various other individuals and entities.275 But could the same be done
to a foreign entity that had not engaged in hacking, and instead focused entirely
on using social media platforms to propagate false information in ways meant to
impact American politics?276
To the surprise of some observers, the Trump administration provided at
least a degree of support for the broader interpretation in March 2018 when it
issued sanctions against Russia’s Internet Research Agency (IRA) under color
https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/12/politics/national-emergencies-trump-opioid/index.html
[https://perma.cc/B9BW-PSAR]; see also Catherine Padhi, Emergencies Without End: A Primer on
Federal States of Emergency, LAWFARE (Dec. 8, 2017), https://lawfareblog.com/emergencies-withoutend-primer-federal-states-emergency [https://perma.cc/FW7X-PG75].
273. Exec. Order No. 13694, 80 Fed. Reg. 18,077 (Apr. 1, 2015).
274. Exec. Order No. 13757, 82 Fed. Reg. 1 (Dec. 28, 2016).
275. See Issuance of Amended Executive Order 13694; Cyber-Related Sanctions Designation,
U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFACEnforcement/Pages/20161229.aspx [https://perma.cc/7A6G-NUVL].
276. The Treasury Department has indicated that it will promulgate regulations defining “cyberenabled activities,” and in the meantime has offered a less-formal explanation of its view that emphasizes
unauthorized access, yes, but also includes much broader language: “We anticipate that regulations to
be promulgated will define ‘cyber-enabled’ activities to include any act that is primarily accomplished
through or facilitated by computers or other electronic devices. For purposes of E.O. 13694, malicious
cyber-enabled activities include deliberate activities accomplished through unauthorized access to a
computer system, including by remote access; circumventing one or more protection measures,
including by bypassing a firewall; or compromising the security of hardware or software in the supply
chain. These activities are often the means through which the specific harms enumerated in the E.O. are
achieved, including compromise to critical infrastructure, denial of service attacks, or massive loss of
sensitive information, such as trade secrets and personal financial information.” (emphasis added).
OFAC FAQs: Other Sanctions Programs, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_other.aspx [https://perma.cc/JPB9-W29J].
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of this framework.277 The IRA, infamously, had engaged in extensive efforts to
propagate false information into the American political debate. When the Trump
administration sanctioned it under color of the cyber executive order, this seemed
to endorse the proposition that politically targeted information operations carried
out online were enough, even without hacking, to trigger the IEEPA framework.
A close read of the Treasury Department’s explanation of IRA’s inclusion,
however, includes just enough reference to “misappropriation of information”
and to illegal use of stolen personally identifiable information so as to muddy the
precedent.278
Bearing this lingering uncertainty in mind, we recommend promulgation of
a new national emergency specifically tailored to attempts by foreign entities to
inject false information into America’s political dialogue, without any need to
show that such efforts at some point happened to involve hacking or any other
“cyber-enabled” means. This would eliminate any doubt about the immediate
availability of IEEPA-based sanctions. Attempts to employ deep fakes in aid of
such efforts would, of course, be encompassed in such a regime.
E. Market Solutions
We anticipate two types of market-based reactions to the deep-fake threat.
First, we expect the private sector to develop and sell services intended to protect
customers from at least some forms of deep fake-based harms. Such innovations
might build on the array of services that have emerged in recent years in response
to customer anxieties about identity theft and the like. Second, we expect at least
some social media companies to take steps on their own initiative to police
against deep-fake harms on their platforms. They will do this not just because
they perceive market advantage in doing so, of course, but also for reasons
including policy preferences and, perhaps, concern over what legislative
interventions, including amendments to Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act, might occur down the road if they take no action. Both prospects
offer benefits, but there are both limits and risks as well.

277. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Russian Cyber Actors for
Interference with the 2016 U.S. Elections and Malicious Cyber Attacks (Mar. 15, 2018)
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0312 [https://perma.cc/2YRG-68XQ].
278. See id. (“The Internet Research Agency LLC (IRA) tampered with, altered, or caused a
misappropriation of information with the purpose or effect of interfering with or undermining election
processes and institutions. Specifically, the IRA tampered with or altered information in order to
interfere with the 2016 U.S. election. The IRA created and managed a vast number of fake online
personas that posed as legitimate U.S. persons to include grassroots organizations, interest groups, and
a state political party on social media. Through this activity, the IRA posted thousands of ads that reached
millions of people online. The IRA also organized and coordinated political rallies during the run-up to
the 2016 election, all while hiding its Russian identity. Further, the IRA unlawfully utilized personally
identifiable information from U.S. persons to open financial accounts to help fund IRA operations.”).
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1. Immutable Life Logs as an Alibi Service
Consider a worst-case scenario: a world in which it is cheap and easy to
portray people as having done or said things they did not say or do, with
inadequate technology to quickly and reliably expose fakes and inadequate law
or policy tools to deter and punish them. In that environment, a person who
cannot credibly demonstrate their real location, words, and deeds at a given
moment will be at greater risk than those who can. Credible alibis will become
increasingly valuable as a result; demand for new ways to secure them—for
services that ensure that one can disprove a harmful fake—will grow, spurring
innovation as companies see a revenue opportunity.
We predict the development of a profitable new service: immutable life
logs or authentication trails that make it possible for a victim of a deep fake to
produce a certified alibi credibly proving that he or she did not do or say the
thing depicted.279
From a technical perspective, such services will be made possible by
advances in a variety of technologies including wearable tech; encryption;
remote sensing; data compression, transmission, and storage; and blockchainbased record-keeping. That last element will be particularly important, for a
vendor hoping to provide such services could not succeed without earning a
strong reputation for the immutability and comprehensiveness of its data;
otherwise, the service would not have the desired effect when called upon in the
face of an otherwise-devastating deep fake.
Providing access to a credible digital alibi would not be enough, however.
The vendor also would need to be able to provide quick and effective
dissemination of it; the victim alone often will be in a poor position to
accomplish that, for the reasons discussed above in Part I. But it is possible that
one or a few providers of an immutable life log service can accomplish this to
no small degree. The key would be partnerships with a wide array of social media
platforms, with arrangements made for those companies to rapidly and reliably
coordinate with the provider when a complaint arises regarding possible deepfake content on their site.
Obviously, not everyone would want such a service even if it could work
reasonably effectively as a deep-fake defense mechanism. But some individuals
(politicians, celebrities, and others whose fortunes depend to an unusual degree
on fragile reputations) will have sufficient fear of suffering irreparable harm
from deep fakes that they may be willing to agree to—and pay for—a service
that comprehensively tracks and preserves their movements, surrounding visual
circumstances, and perhaps in-person and electronic communications; although
providers may be reluctant to include audio-recording capacity because some

279. This notion is by no means new. Indeed, Anita Allen presciently discussed this possibility
in her work. See Anita L. Allen, Dredging Up the Past: Lifelogging, Memory, Surveillance, 75 U. CHI.
L. REV. 47 (2008).
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states criminalize the interception of electronic communications unless all
parties to a communication consent to the interception.280
Of course, a subset of such a service—location verification—is available
already, thanks to the ubiquity of phones with location tracking features as well
as cell-site location records. But it is one thing to have theoretical access to a
business record proving that a device (though not necessarily the person
associated with it) was in some general location. It would be quite another to
have ready and reliable access to proof—perhaps backed by video—that the
person was in a very precise location and acting and speaking in particular ways.
And if the provider of such a service manages to partner with major platforms in
a way that facilitates not just reliable but rapid and efficient verification services,
this could be a sizable advantage.
Even so, it may be that few individuals will want to surrender privacy in
this way. We think it likely, though, that more than a few organizations will
consider requiring use of tracking services by at least some employees at least
some of the time. The protective rationale for the service will be a considerable
incentive for the organization, but note that this interest might dovetail robustly
with distinct managerial interests in deterring or catching employee misfeasance
and malfeasance. This is much like the earlier wave of innovation that led to
installation of dashboard cameras in police cars and the current wave involving
the proliferation of body cameras on the officers themselves.
We urge caution in encouraging the emergence of such services. Whatever
the benefits, the social cost (should such services emerge and prove popular)
would be profound.
Proliferation of comprehensive life logging would have tremendous
spillover impacts on privacy in general. Indeed, it risks what has been called the
“unraveling of privacy”281—the outright functional collapse of privacy via social
consent despite legal protections intended to preserve it. Scott Peppet has warned
that, as more people relinquish their privacy voluntarily, the remainder
increasingly risks being subject to the inference that they have something to
hide.282 This dynamic might eventually overcome the reluctance of some
holdouts. Worse, the holdouts in any event will lose much of their lingering
privacy, as they find themselves increasingly surrounded by people engaged in
life-logging.
Note the position of power in which this places the suppliers of these
services. The scale and nature of the data they would host would be
280. See Danielle Keats Citron, Spying Inc., 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1243, 1263 (2015)
(explaining that twelve states criminalize the interception of electronic communications unless all parties
to the communication consent to the interception); Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP
Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1486 (2009). So long as one party to communications consent
to interception, the remaining state laws—38—and federal law permit the practice.
281. Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a FullDisclosure Future, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1153, 1159 (2015).
282. Id. at 1180.
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extraordinary, both as to individual clients and more broadly across segments of
society or even society as a whole. A given company might commit not to exploit
that data for commercial or research purposes, hoping instead to draw revenue
solely from customer subscriptions. But the temptation to engage in predictive
marketing, or to sell access to the various slices of the data, would be
considerable. The company would possess a database of human behavior of
unprecedented depth and breadth, after all, or what Paul Ohm has called a
“database of ruin.”283 The Cambridge Analytica/Facebook scandal might pale in
comparison to the possibilities unleashed by such a database.
The existence of such a database would also raise privacy issues vis-à-vis
government investigators. Certainly law enforcement entities would wish to
access this rich trove of information in many cases.284 Whether they could do so
without a warrant, however, is unclear at the current time. The Supreme Court’s
2018 decision in Carpenter v. United States unsettled the so-called “third-party
doctrine” (i.e., the rule that the Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant
for government access to records held by a third party).285 While Carpenter
disclaimed any intent to abandon the third-party doctrine with respect to
“conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras,”286
the opinion suggests that a warrant likely would be required in the case of a
police search of a database of the kind created by comprehensive life logging.
Indeed, a life-logging database would enable precisely the sort of pervasive
surveillance of someone’s life that triggered the warrant for access to cell-site
location data.287 Congress or state legislatures might directly impose such a
requirement by statute. But at any rate, the important point is that—once the right
legal process is used—the government’s capacity to know all about a suspect
would be unrivaled as a historical matter (especially as combined with other
existing aggregations of data).

283. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1748 (2010).
284. See Neil Richards, The Third Party Doctrine and the Future of the Cloud, 94 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1441, 1444 (2017).
285. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). For an insightful discussion of the
Carpenter decision, see Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 357
(2019).
286. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
287. The Carpenter decision follows logically from the opinions articulated in United States v.
Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), which David Gray and one of us (Citron) argued amounted to the
recognition of a right to quantitative privacy. See David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to
Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 64–65 (2013) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment erects
protection against broad and indiscriminate surveillance that is tantamount to a general warrant). Though
the third-party doctrine was not actually modified in United States v. Jones, five justices in that case
expressed doubt about the wisdom of simply applying the third-party doctrine unaltered to
circumstances involving novel information technologies that do not necessarily track the premises of the
analog age that gave rise to that doctrine and that raise the spectre of a surveillance state. 565 U.S. at
89–92.
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Despite helping to identify those guilty of crime and avoid mistaken
prosecution of the innocent, this would produce unprecedented opportunities for
government authorities to stumble across—and then pursue—other misdeeds,
and not only those of the original suspect. Society may not be prepared to accept
what might then be a sharp increase in the degree of detection and enforcement
that would follow. Moreover, the situation also would expose investigators to a
considerable amount of information that might not be inculpatory as such, but
that might, nonetheless, provide important leverage over the suspect or others.
Again, the resulting enhancement of prosecutorial capacity will be welcome in
some quarters, but may cause an erosion of commitment to privacy and other
values. At the very least, this would deserve careful consideration by
policymakers and lawmakers.
Ultimately, a world with widespread life logging of this kind might yield
more good than harm, particularly if paired with legislation guarding access to,
use of, and security accorded such comprehensive databases. But it might not.
For now, our aim is no more and no less than to identify the possibility that the
rise of deep fakes will in turn give birth to such a service, and to flag the
implications this will have for privacy. Enterprising businesses may seek to meet
the pressing demand to counter deep fakes in this way, but it does not follow that
society should welcome—or wholly accept—that development. Careful
reflection is essential now, before either deep fakes or responsive services get
too far ahead of us.
2. Speech Policies of Platforms
Our last set of observations concern what may prove to be the most salient
response mechanism of them all: the content screening-and-removal policies of
the platforms themselves, as expressed and established via their terms-of-service
(TOS) agreements.
TOS agreements are the single most important documents governing digital
speech in today’s world, in contrast to prior ages where the First Amendment
provided the road map for speech that was permissible in public discourse.288
Today’s most important speech fora, for better or worse, are online platforms,
not public fora like public parks or streets. TOS agreements of private companies
determine if speech on the major platforms is visible, prominent, or viewed, or
if instead it is hidden, muted, or never available at all.289 TOS agreements thus
will be primary battlegrounds in the fight to minimize the harms that deep fakes
may cause. The First Amendment has little to say about the choices that private
companies make about what speech can and cannot appear on their services.
Some TOS agreements already ban certain categories of content. For
instance, Twitter has long banned impersonation, without regard to the

288.
289.

See Citron & Richards, supra note 45, at 1362.
See Klonick, supra note 192, at 1630–38.
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technology involved in making the impersonation persuasive.290 And Google’s
policy against non-consensual pornography now clearly applies to deep fakes of
that kind. These are salutary developments, and other platforms can and should
follow their lead even as all the platforms explore the question of what other
variants of deep fakes likewise should be the subject of TOS prohibition.
As the platforms explore this question, though, they should explicitly
commit themselves to what one of us (Citron) has called “technological due
process.”291 Technological due process requires companies be transparent—not
just notionally but in real practical terms—about their speech policies. Platforms
should be clear, for example, about what precisely they mean when they ban
impersonation generally and deep fakes specifically. In our view, platforms
should recognize that some deep fakes are not on balance problematic and should
remain online. Thus, TOS should specify that deep-fake ban would not cover
satire, parody, art, or education, as explored above. In our view, such deep fakes
should not normally be filtered, blocked, muted, or relegated to obscurity.
Platforms should provide accountability for their speech-suppression
decisions, moreover. Users should be notified that their (alleged) deep-fake posts
have been blocked, removed, or muted and given a meaningful chance to
challenge the decision.292 After all, as we noted above there is a significant risk
that growing awareness of the deep fake threat will carry with it bad faith
exploitation of that awareness on the part of those who seek to avoid
accountability for their real words and actions via a well-timed allegation of
fakery.
The subject of technological due process also draws attention to the
challenge of just how platforms can and should identify and respond to content
that may be fake. For now, platforms must rely on users and in-house content
moderators to identify deep fakes. The choice between human decision-making
and automation is crucial to technological due process.293 Exclusive reliance on
automated filtering is not the answer, at least for now, because it is too likely to
be plagued both by false positives and false negatives.294 It may have a useful
290. CITRON & JURECIC, PLATFORM JUSTICE, supra note 46 at 14; see also CITRON, HATE
CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 228–42 (calling for platforms to adopt speech rules and
procedures that provide greater transparency and accountability).
291. Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 245. Kate Klonick takes up this model in her
groundbreaking work on the speech rules and practices of content platforms who she calls the “New
Speech Governors.” Klonick, supra note 192, at 1668–69.
292. Note that 17 U.S.C. § 512(g) (2012) (part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act) includes
a provision requiring notice where an entity removes content based on a copyright infringement concern.
Our proposal is not limited to copyright-infringement takedowns and would apply to muting or other
forms of suppression that reduce visibility without outright removal of the content. Crucially, we are
also not suggesting that law require moderation practices that emulates technological due process.
Instead, we invoke the concept as an analogy to commitments to transparency and accountability, one
that would be adopted voluntarily in the market, not as a direct regulatory mandate.
293. See CITRON & JURECIC, PLATFORM JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 17.
294. Cf. Georgia Wells et al., The Big Loophole that Left Facebook Vulnerable to Russia
Propaganda, WALL ST. J (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-big-loophole-that-left-

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3213954

2019]

DEEP FAKES

1819

role to play in flagging specific content for further review by actual analysts, but
normally should not serve as the last word or the basis for automatic speechsuppressive action (though an exception would be proper for situations in which
content previously has been determined, with due care, to be fraudulent, and
software detects that someone is attempting to post that identical content).
The good news—and we would like to end on such a note—is that some of
the largest platforms do recognize the problem deep fakes present, and are
beginning to take steps to respond. Facebook, for example, plans to emphasize
video content to a growing degree and has stated that it will begin tracking fake
videos.295 Also underway are efforts to emphasize videos from verified sources
while also affirmatively deemphasizing ones that are not; this will not correspond
perfectly with legitimate versus fake videos of course, but it might help to some
degree, although at some cost to the ability of anonymous speakers to be heard
via that platform.296 Much more will be needed, but the start is welcome.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the adage about sticks-and-stones, words in the form of
lies have always had the ability cause significant harm to individuals,
organizations, and society at large. From that perspective, the rise of deep fakes
might seem merely a technological twist to a long-standing social ill.
But another adage—that a picture is worth a thousand words—draws
attention to what makes the deep-fake phenomenon more significant than that.
Credible yet fraudulent audio and video will have a much-magnified impact, and
today’s social media-oriented information environment interacts with our
cognitive biases in ways that exacerbate the effect still further. A host of costs
and dangers will follow, and our legal and policy architectures are not optimally
designed to respond. Our recommendations would help with that to some degree,
but the problem to a considerable degree would still remain. A great deal of
further creative thinking is needed. We hope to have spurred some it by sounding
this alarm.

facebook-vulnerable-to-russian-propaganda-1519314265 [https://perma.cc/3HU9-HYV7] (reporting
that YouTube mistakenly promoted a conspiratorial video falsely accusing a teenage witness to the
Parkland school shooting of being an actor).
295. Id.
296. Id.
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